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History and Literature in 19th-Century France: From Poetics to Positivism 
History held a prominent place in French intellectual life across the 19th century, but in a 
form that would be unrecognizable to the contemporary historian. French historian Gérard 
Noiriel observes that “until the 1880s, history was a discipline without real autonomy, dominated 
by literature and philosophy, subordinated to the concerns of political struggle.”1 Nevertheless, 
interpreting and understanding the past was an urgent task: Historian Zrinka Stahuljak notes that 
“in the wake of the social upheavals and political revolutions that ended the eighteenth century, 
the past imposed itself as the object of study that would reveal the internal logic”2 of what 
French historian Ernest Renan (1823–1892) called the “interplay and laws of human 
revolutions.”3 The first steps toward establishing a broad institutional and national understanding 
of the past took place in the 1830s, when historian François Guizot, the Minister of the Interior 
under the July Monarchy, which lasted from 1830–1848, expanded primary education 
significantly in the country.4 But the professional academic practice of capital-H “History” as we 
currently understand it did not emerge in France until the century’s end. This thesis examines the 
shifts in epistemological frameworks that precipitated the development of the historical 
discipline as we understand it today, and how those shifts manifested at the formal, discursive 
level, providing a new way to think about the past, represent it, and ultimately make a claim as to 
its meaning and relevance to the present. 
 
 
1 Gérard Noiriel, “Naissance du Métier d’Historien” [“Birth of the Profession of Historian”], Genèses 1 (1990): 59. 
All translations of this work are my own. 
2 Zrinka Stahuljak, “History as a Medical Category: Heredity, Positivism, and the Study of the Past in Nineteenth-
Century France,” History of the Present 3:2 (2013): 141. 
3 Ernest Renan, as quoted in Stahuljak, 141. 
4 Stahuljak, 141. 
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The study of the past lacked a standard methodology even by mid-century—historians 
were often rhetoricians as much as researchers of the past. For example, the influential French 
historian Jules Michelet applied in 1836 for a position at the elite Collège de France in any 
available chair in classical languages, history, or philosophy—and ended up as chair in both of 
the latter two positions.5 What’s more, history was hardly institutionalized at all before the last 
decades of the century. Of over 150,000 pages of “history” published each year as late as the 
start of the French Third Republic in 1870, only two percent were penned by academics.6 In this 
fluid period, history had few, if any, standards for research methodology, the use of primary 
sources, or rhetorical form. The historical work, which was largely the purview of liberal and 
“romantic” historians, such as Michelet, occupied a somewhat indeterminate position between 
that of a contemporary factual account and a literary, even poetic, narrative of the past. 
By the century’s end, French historians, influenced by the positivist scientific philosophy 
of French intellectual August Comte (1798–1857) as well as the source-based methodology of 
German historian Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886),7 had made the discipline into an academic 
profession. Noiriel writes that “history could begin to aspire to the status of science thanks to its 
professionalization.”8 At the heart of this new professional history was “a massive claim of 
objectivity… an epistemological principle more or less inspired by Comtism.”9 Positivist 
historians “identified their [historical] ‘realism’ with the kind of comprehension of natural 
processes which the physical sciences provided.”10 This commitment to objectivity was the 
 
5 Arthur Mitzman, Michelet, Historian: Rebirth and Romanticism in 19th-Century France (New Haven; London: Yale 
University Press, 1990), 13. 
6 Noiriel, 60. 
7 Noiriel notes that Germany professionalized history about half a century before French institutions began a similar 
process (66). 
8 Stahuljak, 141. 
9 Noiriel, 70, italics Noiriel’s. 
10 Hayden V. White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1973), 46. 
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method by which historians standardized their practice and separated it from the rhetorical and 
literary traditions with which it had previously been associated. Noiriel notes that post-
professionalization, “the value of a historian now rests on a group of criteria specific to the 
[historian’s] milieu.”11 In addition to being an institutionally motivated shift, Stahuljak notes that 
history’s positivist turn was the result of a disciplinary “quest for influence in matters of social 
and public policy.”12 In short, the evolution of the historical discipline in France is at least 
partially the product of the relationship between methodology and politics.  
Indeed, history’s methodological shift took place alongside sea changes in French politics 
and political ideology. During the July Monarchy (1830–1848), the dominant political cadre 
were bourgeois liberals, who believed in a French people unified by a common French national 
identity and served by the French state. This state, however, was not one of mass democracy, but 
rather ruled by the bourgeois themselves. Murray-Miller notes that during this era, “Education, 
wealth, and social distinction demonstrated one’s ability to make judicious political decisions 
and conceptualize the greater social good outside personal interest, and these qualities formed the 
basis of an open aristocracy.”13 This belief was grounded in an idealistic conception of inherent 
French social coherence, which would be dealt a death blow in 1848. 
In the second half of the century, French liberalism underwent a substantial shift in its 
animating ideology. Stahuljak argues that “the fading of idealism, after the failure of the 
revolutions of 1848 and the proclamation of the Second Empire by Napoleon III… gave a real 
impetus to positivism and scientism.”14 At the founding of the French Third Republic in 1870, 
 
11 Noiriel, 70. 
12 Stahuljak, 140. 
13 Gavin Murray-Miller, “Neither Reformers nor ‘Réformés’: The Construction of French Modernity in the Nineteenth 
Century,” Historical Reflections / Réflexions Historiques 40:3 (2014): 49 
14 Stahuljak, 141-142. 
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the class conflict and fierce intra-national political animosity of 1848 was far from past. 
Romantic, liberal ideologies like Michelet’s, which posited history as a near-metaphysical 
narrative of nationalist triumph, were tossed out by the French ruling class. In their place 
emerged rationalist principles that could ostensibly explain (or at least conceal) social 
disharmony in addition to social harmony, which earlier historians sought to enshrine as the 
precondition for historical progress.  
Instead of idealizing a universal national identity, French elites identified their liberal 
political program with “modernity” and “progress,” which were themselves identified with rapid 
innovation in the sciences and scientific ways of knowing and representing reality. By seizing 
upon these new ideas and grafting them onto principles of government and social behavior, 
French elites adopted a “logic of a universalized modernity… with a profound sense of moral 
authority and purpose.”15 This universalized modernity, predicated on science, was ostensibly 
free of any prior political commitment. Noiriel notes that in history, specifically, the shift 
towards a putatively ideologically uncommitted objectivity was an “illustration of the profound 
desire for emancipation from the philosophical or political norms to which the discipline had 
been subordinated previously.”16 In other words, while history’s shift to an objective 
epistemological framework was reflective of a larger shift in academia and the social sciences 
towards positivism, it was also a response to history’s specifically political status, and an attempt 
to liberate it from that status, which was perceived as limiting history’s potential to generate 
unbiased knowledge.  
I argue that this shift is not only reflected in history’s methodological practices, but also 
in its form: as the historical work took on a different understanding of how the past is to be 
 
15 Murray-Miller, “Neither Reformers nor ‘Réformés,’” 57. 
16 Noiriel, 70. 
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depicted and interpreted, its discursive practices changed, too. Further, I argue that this shift in 
the idea of what constitutes the practice of “history” is reflected in historical thinking more 
broadly, including in the historically aware fiction that was popular in 19th-century France. The 
manner in which history is analyzed and discussed discursively is revealing of how historical 
thinkers and writers conceived of the purpose of history and the best way to disclose that purpose 
via a narrative, even a fictional one. 
Concomitant with a renewed, refocused interest in history in early-19th-century France17 
was the rise of a new form of fiction: the realist novel. Often identified with French writer 
Honoré de Balzac (1799–1850), French realists of note include Stendhal (1743–1842), Gustave 
Flaubert (1821–1880), Alphonse Daudet (1840–1897), and Émile Zola (1840–1902). Broadly 
speaking, French realism is a genre of social specificity: its writers drew heavily from their own 
real-world experiences in describing contemporary life with the goal of, as the movement’s name 
implies, accurately representing reality. Put differently, the goal of the realist novel is a fictitious 
spin on one of the goals of history: depicting a moment with accuracy. 
Literary scholar and historian Sandy Petrey argues that the realist movement began in 
1830, when Stendhal’s novel Le Rouge et le Noir [The Red and the Black] was published.18 1830 
was also the year of the July Revolution, when bourgeois opponents of the reactionary Bourbon 
Regime, which had come to power after Napoleon’s defeat in 1814, deposed King Charles X and 
installed in his place King Louis Phillipe I, a much more liberal monarch. The replacement of a 
 
17 French historians including Prosper de Barante, Augustin Thierry, Jules Michelet, and François Guizot showed 
particular interest in the history of the French Revolution and the 18th century in France, although some works, such 
as Michelet’s Histoire de France, attempted to cover time spans from the present to as long ago as the first century 
CE. 
18 Sandy Petrey, In the Court of the Pear King: French Culture and the Rise of Realism (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2005), 119. Petrey maintains that although Stendhal’s work marks “the first novel to configure the realist 
aesthetic” (Pear King, 119), Honoré de Balzac “stands supreme among realist literature’s originators and most 
accomplished practitioners” (Pear King, 49). 
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conservative monarchy with a more liberal one brought liberal historians, including Michelet, 
into orthodox institutional positions in the French government and academy. Petrey also argues 
that the paradox of a “revolution” replacing one monarchy with another is demonstrative of one 
of the fundamental concerns of literary realism: “exploring the mechanisms through which 
reality goes away or comes thundering out of nowhere.”19 Thus, the birth of the realist novel 
takes place within, and is a result of, the same set of political and cultural crises that created a 
renewed interest in history. In both (as yet unprofessionalized) history and the realist novel, 
thinkers were attempting to write their way through fundamental questions about the nature and 
organization of societies in transformation.  
In many ways, realist novels20 have a similar goal to history: telling a compelling and 
plausible story that represents something about the way that the world really is. Balzac wrote that 
he hoped his novels would “[comprehend] at the same time the history and the critique of 
Society.”21 And Zola, writing decades later from a drastically more positivist standpoint, wrote 
that the novelist should ideally represent the “absolute determinism in the conditions of 
existence.”22 
Notably, both authors set their novels in the recent past. Peter Brooks notes that most of 
Balzac’s work was written in the 1830s and 1840s, but is largely set in the 1820s, during the 
Bourbon Restoration, and that “this retrospective view of society allowed him to become the first 
 
19 Petrey, Pear King, 48. 
20 A term I use here to refer to both the culturally specific genre known as “realism” and the practice of creating a 
fictional prosaic narrative that corresponds to some extra-textual reality. 
21 Honoré de Balzac, L’avant-propos de la Comédie Humaine [foreword to the Human Comedy] (Paris: Gallimard, 
1976), 12-13. All translations mine. 
22 Émile Zola, Le Roman Experimental [The Experimental Novel], 5th edition, Gallica, 
https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k113130k.r=le%20roman%20experimental?rk=21459;2 (October 23, 2007), 1. 
All translations mine. [Original Source: Émile Zola, Le Roman Experimental, 5th edition (Paris: G. Charpentier, 
1881)]. 
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writer truly to seize the meaning of the emergent modern world.”23 And Zola’s Rougon-
Macquart cycle of novels, subtitled a “natural and social history of a family under the Second 
Empire,” chronicles the lives of the Rougon-Macquart family during the reign of Napoleon III, 
whose empire had collapsed less than a year before the first book in the series was published. In 
the preface to the first Rougon-Macquart novel, Zola wrote that his characters “recount the 
Second Empire, with the help of their individual dramas, from the trap of the coup d’État to 
treachery of Sedan.”24/25 In both cases, setting their work in the recent past was one method by 
which Balzac and Zola attempted to use the benefit of hindsight to explain more fully what was 
really going on at the time—to interpret the world from a historical perspective.  
The obvious point of difference between the quasi-historical novel and history is that a 
novelist is permitted to invent all manner of things that the historian is not.26 Nevertheless, the 
quasi-documentary27 realist novel, which was quite popular in 19th-century France, must be taken 
seriously as a perspective on one of the fundamental concerns of historians: the relationship 
between an isolated historical “fact” and a broader historical “truth,” and how the two might be 
tied together and given form through narrative. This question was unsettled in 19th-century 
French institutions. At a time when a discipline-specific way of looking at the world 
 
23 Peter Brooks, Balzac’s Lives (New York: New York Review Books, 2020), 4. 
24 Émile Zola, Preface to La Fortune des Rougon, Bibliothèque électronique du Québec, 
https://beq.ebooksgratuits.com/vents/zola-01.pdf, 5. All translations are my own. [Original Source: Émile Zola, La 
Fortune des Rougon (Paris : Bibliothèque-Charpentier, 1906)]. 
25 The “coup d’État” refers to French president Napoleon III’s self-coup in 1851, when he dissolved the National 
Assembly before declaring the Second French Empire in 1852. “Sedan” refers to Napoleon III’s defeat at the Battle 
of Sedan in September of 1870, which resulted in his capture and effectively marked the end of the Second Empire. 
26 However, realist novelists may choose to impose requirements on themselves in this respect, as Zola did when he 
wrote Germinal. Zola worked as a journalist and critic before he became well-known for his novels, and travelled to 
coal mines in the north of France to conduct research for Germinal, which is set in such a mine. He was known to 
defend the factual accuracy of his descriptions of mining life against accusations of sensationalism. For more 
information about Zola’s research and its role in the planning and execution of Germinal, see: Richard H. Zakarian, 
Zola’s “Germinal”; a critical study of its primary sources (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1972). 
27 As my second and third thesis chapters demonstrate, realist novels have historically been read to gain insight into 
past social attitudes, understandings, and configurations. 
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“historically” had yet to be fully elaborated, realism’s generic goal was to record “humanity as it 
is,” to use Leopold von Ranke’s phrase—to reveal the social conditions under which people live 
or lived.28 Interrogating the methods by which the world can be narratively represented “as it is” 
is the subject of this thesis.   
Positivist Epistemology and the Politics of Historical Consciousness 
My thesis examines the fluid boundaries between French historical and literary writing in 
the 19th century, and the shifts in “historical consciousness” that occurred in both fields as the 
century progressed.29 I examine three exemplary French writers—Michelet, a historian, and 
Balzac and Zola, novelists—considering each primarily as a historical thinker. Ultimately, what 
this analysis shows is that as the 19th century progressed, the broad shift in French institutions 
towards positivist epistemological and explanatory frameworks is reflected in literature as well 
as history. Both disciplines were subject to similar discursive standards, and those standards 
shifted in comparable ways as positivism and scientism became dominant conceptual 
frameworks. As positivism infiltrated the practice of history, pushing it farther into the realm of 
science, a similar effect is observable in the historical thinking of the novelists I examine. 
This shift can be understood as evidence of positivistic thought’s growing influence as 
the 19th century progressed in France. Additionally, the shift in historical consciousness away 
from integrative and synthetic frameworks, which presuppose broad social harmony, to causal 
ones, which do not, reflects broader social fragmentation as the country vacillated between 
various forms of government and their ideologies across the century. As political regimes and 
 
28 Leopold von Ranke, as quoted in Felix Gilbert, “Historiography: What Ranke Meant,” The American Scholar 56:3 
(1987): 394. 
29 Following the work of historian Hayden White, I use this term to mean the ways in which one thinks about 
history, addressing questions like: how is history conceptualized and/or constructed? What are the primary forces 
that create and drive historical events? What is the purpose of history to the contemporary observer?  
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ideologies came and went, novelists, like historians, turned to rationalist frameworks and 
discourses, rather than idealistic or metaphysical ones, to explain their rapidly evolving political, 
social, and cultural moments. In addition to analyzing the impact these shifts had on historical 
consciousness in France, my thesis attempts to understand how historical thinking changes in 
response to shifts in political authority and ideology. Examining how realist and/or historical 
narratives shifted at the formal, rhetorical level as rationalism became the dominant intellectual 
and political framework provides one possible way to consider how changes in discursive 
practices reflect and even create changes in the political, ideological, and philosophical 
implications of works created within that discourse. 
Petrey writes that “Society produces the world in which its members live [and] history 
determines what society is. Realism’s constitutive purpose is to assert that proposition.”30 Realist 
literature, as a narrative representation of reality, is well-equipped to interrogate how social 
discourse is a key part of constructing “reality.” If history determines what society is, then the 
discursive form that a realist historical narrative takes, be it scholarly or novelistic, has major 
implications for the society that that history produces, and by extension the reality that that 
society creates. 
Methods 
 My main sources are a combination of writing about the past and writing about writing 
about the past. By the former, I mean a mix of stories that claim to represent the real world by 
recounting either actual events that happened or fictional narratives that are instructive as to what 
could or might happen. And by writing about this documentary writing, I mean criticism and 
 
30 Petrey, Pear King, 143. 
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explanation from both contemporary scholars and historical writers discussing how and why that 
documentary writing is useful.  
For the former, my sources include some of the most critically celebrated and 
commercially successful novels of 19th-century France, namely Honoré de Balzac’s series The 
Human Comedy and Germinal from Émile Zola’s Rougon-Macquart series. They also include 
the historical work of Jules Michelet, a prominent figure in the early-19th-century French 
historical canon. For the latter, my sources are largely scholarly or literary criticism, or reflexive 
commentary from the historical writers themselves. These writings are a useful window into how 
their authors conceived of the shape and process of history in their works, and whether these 
self-expressed views cohere with the implicit historical ideas that I examine in those works. 
I analyze these sources in two ways. First, I close-read documentary sources from 
Michelet, Balzac, and Zola to identify how they present the relationship between the past (e.g.  
the “what” of history) and historical narrative (the “why”)—what do these stories have to say 
about why and how history happens? Second, I zoom-out by borrowing analytical techniques 
from the historian Hayden White to understand how these works use formal and rhetorical 
techniques to turn contingent historical events into a coherent historical narrative. How are the 
“why” and “how” of history given life and form through narrative and language—particularly 
through metaphorical, figurative language? 
The Players 
 The three writers I examine have each been the subject of a vast amount of historical 
scholarship. Jules Michelet was the historian par excellence of the July Monarchy. His 
nationalist philosophy of history represents a dominant strain in early-19th-century French 
historiography, just as his poetic style represents the literary qualities of early-19th-century 
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historians. Although criticized for his subjectivity, Michelet has also been recognized as a 
methodological innovator, consulting primary sources at the National Archives in Paris even 
before Ranke’s source-based methodology was adopted by French historians. His place in 
historiography and the historiographical canon has been established and evaluated by many 
French thinkers, including the influential 20th-century critic Roland Barthes as well as modern 
historians of the Annales school, particularly Lucien Febvre. In the main, Michelet is considered 
the apotheosis of the literary style of early-19th-century French history, as well as the theoretical 
predecessor of the Annales school, due to his methodological emphasis on excavating the past in 
its totality, “a predecessor to the kind of microcosmic and popular histoire des mentalités with 
which the Annales was associated.”31 
 Likewise, historical researchers and historicist literary critics have produced a vast body 
of research on Balzac and Zola. Balzac, the foremost realist novelist, pursued an unsuccessful 
career in law, among other failed enterprises, before finding commercial success as a fiction 
writer in 1830s Paris. He has been lauded by 20th-century Marxist critic György Lukács, among 
others, as an “inexorable observer of the social history of France.”32 Zola, for his part, was born a 
generation after Balzac, and worked as a journalist and critic in Paris during Napoleon III’s 
Second French Empire (1852–1870) before finding recognition as a novelist. He was notable not 
just for his dedication to primary sources in writing his realist novels, but for his popularity: one 
anglophone critic noted in 1923 that his “name and influence have loomed larger in America, 
England and Germany than those of any of his predecessors or contemporaries in the Realistic 
Movement.”33 
 
31 Bettina R. Lerner, “Michelet, Mythologue,” Yale French Studies 111 (2007): 61. 
32 György Lukács, Studies in European Realism (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964), 38. 
33 Ernest Boyd, “Realism in France,” The New Republic, March 21, 1923. 
(https://newrepublic.com/article/114374/french-realism-balzac-flaubert-zola-and-romanticisms-remains) 
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Much attention has been given by past and present authors and critics to the ways in 
which Balzac’s and Zola’s realist fiction represents and/or responds to the real world. French 
realism was, in its time, treated as an accurate recording of the world as it was. Victor Hugo 
noted at Balzac’s funeral in 1850 that in his works, “one sees all our contemporary civilization 
coming and going and marching and moving with all manner of the bewildering and terrible, 
mixed with the real.”34 However, in the latter half of the 20th century, literary theorists including 
Barthes turned on the genre, accusing the novel, as a purely verbal construction, of being unable 
to faithfully represent anything about the world beyond the page. Writing about Balzac’s novella 
Sarrasine, Barthes claims that “the classic text has nothing more to say than what it says,” 
meaning that the text cannot by nature truly correspond to anything in the real world.35 
Responding to this school of criticism, Sandy Petrey has argued that realism presents a much 
more nuanced understanding of its own relationship to reality than Barthes and his 
contemporaries assumed. Petrey identifies as the genre’s fundamental concern “reality’s 
dependence on the sociopolitical ecosystem certifying it as real.”36 Realism is thought to function 
as a self-conscious model (rather than a reflection, per Barthes) of how “reality” is made.  
However, while Balzac’s and Zola’s presentations of history and its function have been 
thoroughly theorized, and their novels thoroughly contextualized as part of the historical archive, 
less attention has been paid to the broad, structural conceptions of history implied by their 
writing, be it fictive or theoretical. Much has been written, for example, about the wealth of 
historical information and implicit historical analysis on display in the writers’ works. But such 
 
34 Victor Hugo, Victor Hugo, 29 août 1850, sur Honoré de Balzac [Victor Hugo, August 29 1850, on Honoré de 
Balzac], Contreligne, http://www.contreligne.eu/2015/11/victor-hugo-29-aout-1850-sur-honore-de-balzac/ 
(November 2015). [Original Source: Victor Hugo, “On Honoré de Balzac” (eulogy, funeral of Honoré de Balzac, 
Paris, August 29, 1850)]. 
35 Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans. Richard Miller (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1990), 216. 
36 Petrey, Pear King, 119. 
Schuman 16 
analyses generally attend to specific historical details, rather than considering how formal 
decisions about narrative plot, figurative language, and other discursive elements imply their 
own understanding of history.37 In other words, historical analyses of Balzac and Zola often 
emphasize their writing’s content at the expense of its form. By extension, these analyses have 
not fully investigated how Balzac’s and Zola’s chosen discursive forms demonstrate specific 
positions vis-à-vis how to represent real-world or historical “truth” in the form of prosaic 
discourse. 
To fill in this analytical gap and excavate a broader understanding of the historical 
consciousness of these two writers, I borrow much of my analytic methodology from historian 
Hayden White and his schema for the formal, structural analyses of historical narratives. My 
intention is not to examine how questions or philosophies of history manifest in certain Balzac 
and Zola novels, as others have done, but rather to examine, through their works, their personal 
historical consciousnesses, which I see as emblematic of their respective milieus due to their 
well-documented cultural influence. I believe that understanding these historical consciousnesses 
provides a novel way to consider how literary writers—historians as well as novelists—respond 
to their epistemological contexts, attempting to depict “reality” through various formal strategies. 
A White-ian analysis permits such an understanding because it attends to the content implied by 
a writer’s chosen rhetorical form. 
Hayden White and Metahistory 
Much of the theoretical framework of this thesis is indebted to the work of American 
historian Hayden White and his 1973 book Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in 19th-
century Europe. The work remains his most comprehensive elaboration of a technique for the 
 
37 For an example of one such analysis, see: David L. Schalk, “Zola and History: The Historian and 
Zola,” Historical Reflections / Réflexions Historiques 20:1 (1994): 77-93. 
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formal analysis of historical writing. In Metahistory, White develops a “formal theory of the 
historical work” as a form of narrative writing.38 This theory classifies works of history 
according to a schema based on mode of emplotment, formal argument, and ideological 
implication. White argues that these three properties of a historical work constitute a 
“historiographical ‘style’”39 and serve to “prefigure as a possible object of knowledge”40 the 
historical documents and sources under consideration. The apprehension of a structure for 
narrative plot, historical argument, and implied ideology comes before any historical events are 
put in relation to one another.  
Comparing history to language, White writes that this act of selecting a useable field of 
historical events allows the historian to “construct a linguistic protocol, complete with lexical, 
grammatical, syntactical, and semantic dimensions, by which to characterize the field and its 
elements in his own terms… and thus prepare them for the explanation and representation he will 
subsequently offer of them in his narrative.”41 Put differently: because their work is ultimately 
narrative, historians must select, often unconsciously, plot structures and modes of argument 
before the vast information contained in the historical archive can be distilled into a narrative 
that contains a clear beginning and end, in addition to a clear historical and historiographical 
argument. 
Significant to this process is White’s idea that “we understand why a particular story has 
‘turned out’ as it has when we have identified the archetypal myth, or pregeneric plot structure, 
of which the story is an exemplification.”42 What makes a particular history an effective 
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narrative, in White’s thinking, has very little to do with the content of the story and everything to 
do with the nature of the story qua story: “There is something in a historical masterpiece that 
cannot be negated, and this nonnegatable element is its form, the form which is its fiction.”43 A 
thorough understanding of the historical work requires attention not just to its historical qualities, 
but its formal literary qualities, as well.  
White’s work applies techniques of literary analysis to works of history. I begin in the 
same vein, analyzing Michelet’s works as literary objects before buttressing my analysis with 
White’s own assessment of Michelet. I then bring these techniques of literary analysis to 
literature and novelists, however these techniques remain mediated by White’s specifically 
historical understanding. Rather than a strict analysis of language and literary technique, I apply 
these methods with an eye to their historical nature. I use White to ask: how do Balzac’s and 
Zola’s choices of plot structure rhetorical devices reveal what they think about the nature of a 
“true” historical story? After considering Balzac and Zola within a White-ian schema, I explicate 
how their literary choices amount to an implicit philosophy of history. What is important is not 
whether Balzac or Zola had an explicit understanding of their work’s orientation towards the past 
or its study, but rather what their implicit philosophies of history reveal about broader shifts in 
epistemological and explanatory frameworks in 19th-century France. Namely, their historical 
consciousnesses reveal a sharp turn away from an understanding of history as contingent and 
socially determined, and towards an understanding of history as a predetermined, mechanistic 
process—an evolution that reflects the rise of positivism across the sciences, as well as the 
decline of idealistic French liberalism, which informed that rise as it abandoned the fiction of a 
French polity unified by national identity.  
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Chapter 1: Jules Michelet and the Poetics of History 
“My first pages after the July Revolution, written on the burning cobblestones, were a vision of 
the world, of World History, as freedom’s struggle.” 
—Michelet, Preface to the History of France, 186944 
 Lionel Gossman notes that at the beginning of the 19th century, historical writing was a 
“recognized literary [genre].”45 To compare the era’s realist literature and realist historical 
writing,46 then, requires an understanding of how history was different than it is today, and 
specifically how it was literary, in addition to an understanding of how realist literature might be 
labeled historical. Enter Jules Michelet (1798-1874), one of the most widely known historians of 
France and of the 19th century more broadly. White notes that he “dominated” academic 
historiography in France during the July Monarchy.47  
 Born under the First French Republic (which governed the nation during the five years 
between the Reign of Terror and Napoleon Bonaparte’s 1799 coup), Michelet, like many of his 
contemporaries, was a fiercely patriotic historian who attributed all great French historical events 
to the ever-indominable spirit of the French people. He is frequently taken as an exceptionally 
lyrical representative of early-19th-century romantic historiography, which, Gossman notes, is 
“intimately associated with the moderately liberal and nationalist aspirations of the period 
immediately following the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars.”48 His best-known 
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works include his 1831 Introduction to World History, his seven-volume History of the French 
Revolution (1847–1853), and his 17-voume, decades-spanning History of France (1833–1844, 
1885–1863, 1866–1867), where he is credited with cementing, if not inventing, the term 
“renaissance.”49 In these works, Michelet took full use of history’s then-fluid generic and 
rhetorical standards to write aphoristic and sometimes programmatic histories noted for their 
poetic prose in addition to their historical value. He was immensely popular and successful as an 
academic and lectured as the Chair of History and Ethics at the prestigious Collège de France 
from 1838 until his dismissal for political reasons in 1851.  
 To understand how Michelet conceived of history, I proceed in two steps. First, I 
examine several of Michelet’s prefaces to his historical works, as well as his Introduction to 
World History. These texts, along with analyses from Gossman, Barthes, and others, display 
Michelet’s own sense of his work’s ideological bent and political salience, as well as his 
conception of the relationship between rhetoric and history. Second, I summarize White’s 
writing on Michelet in Metahistory, in which he lays out how Michelet emplotted history as a 
romance and described historical events using the figurative descriptive mode of metaphor. From 
these analyses, I arrive at two conclusions which will guide my readings of Balzac and Zola. 
One: historical writing was a much more flexible genre in 19th-century France than it is now. 
And two: romantic historians of the early-to-mid 19th century, of which Michelet might be taken 
as representative, if idiosyncratic, exhibited an important awareness of the political implications 
of history, both related to and apart from its function as accurate or documentary—in short, that 
history’s understanding of “true” or “accurate” as meaning purely “factual” has not, historically, 
been taken for granted. These understandings, which are symptomatic of history’s status as a 
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rhetorical tradition at the century’s beginning, will be echoed by Balzac, and ultimately 
abandoned by Zola in favor of a positivist identification of objective “truth” with the historical, 
social, and existential “real.” 
Michelet and Poetic Prose in 19th-century History 
Michelet’s histories—which, as Barthes notes, “[have] actually become a philosophy of 
history”50—exhibit two apparent contradictions, especially when considered alongside the many 
prefaces he included with his works.51 First, Michelet insists that his work is simultaneously 
totally factually true and nakedly ideologically active. And second, Michelet insists that his 
histories are entirely grounded in prose, and never approach the imaginative, poetic heights that 
led Victor Hugo to remark in a letter to Michelet, “[W]hat a painter you are!”52 By understanding 
how these contradictions appear in Michelet’s work, and why Michelet did not see them as 
contradictions, we can better understand Michelet’s complex historical methodology as well as 
his idea of history’s utility. Considering Michelet as simultaneously a source-based historian and 
an ideologue, and as a poetic writer who scorned the label of “poet,” demonstrates a discourse of 
historical writing that was eschewed as the discipline became professionalized and standardized 
in the decades after Michelet: the blending of factual research with a self-consciously ideological 
interpretation of those facts, expressed via figurative writing, intended to frame that 
interpretation as all but inevitable.  
 From the beginning of his prolific career, Michelet had a clear idea of the arc of history: 
“With the world began a fight which must finish with the world, and not before; that of man 
against nature; of mind against matter; of liberty against fatality. History is nothing but the tale 
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of this interminable fight.”53 Such an all-encompassing view of history necessarily subsumes all 
historical events, no matter how trivial, into its implied narrative of more-or-less linear progress. 
In Introduction à l’Histoire Universelle [Introduction to World History], Michelet presents a 
totalizing (and nakedly Eurocentric) narrative of world history. Temporal progress, he lays out, 
roughly aligns with civilization’s progression westward. At first “overwhelmed by nature” in 
early societies in India,54 human civilization traveled farther west to Persia, where “begins the 
long voyage and progressive emancipation of human liberty,”55 culminating in France and the 
French people, who are henceforth to be the guiding liberatory force in human history, “destined 
to elevate the entire world of intelligence to equality.”56 
This view, in which the French Revolution is a culminating and exemplary moment in 
human history, implies a clear ideological position, which Barthes identifies as “the classic credo 
of the liberal petit-bourgeois around 1840.”57 This ideology, which found expression in the July 
Revolution and the subsequent July Monarchy of the “bourgeois monarch,” Louis Phillipe I, 
sought to “reestablish the European polities on a new, broader basis, national rather than dynastic 
or ethnic.”58 To this effect, Louis Phillipe famously proclaimed himself “King of the French” 
rather than “King of France” to emphasize his popular mandate. The bourgeois political cadre 
who administered the July Monarchy clung to a unifying republican vision that they believed to 
be capable of including all French citizens, and consequently refused to consider class as an axis 
of intra-national political opposition. Michelet shared this belief; he was horrified and 
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disillusioned by the class antagonism of the revolutions of 1848, which deposed Louis-Phillipe 
and replaced him with the first French president, Charles-Louis Napoleon Bonaparte (later 
known as Napoleon III), who would stage a self-coup at the end of 1851 and establish the 
Second French Empire in 1852. Gossman writes that Michelet saw history emerge from the 
barricades of 1848 “wounded and bleeding,” because of how the revolution had polarized the 
French nation.59 
Michelet himself, rather than trying to claim some sort of political or ideological 
neutrality or objectivity in his work, was aware of his own subjective orientation: in his 1869 
preface to the History of France, he asked, “Is not the work colored with the feelings, the times, 
of the person who produced it?”60 His answer: “That is what always happens. No portrait is so 
exact, none so conforms to the model, that the artist has not added to it a little of himself. Our 
masters in history have not escaped from this law.”61 Rather than seeking to avoid the question 
or appeal to some sort of professional competency that prevented biases, Michelet simply 
accepted the possibility of bias, and in the process emerges as a defender of history based at least 
partially upon moral or ideological grounds, not purely on facts. This goes to the very core of 
Michelet’s understanding of history: as he wrote in the conclusion to the tenth volume of his 
Histoire de France, history “does not maintain a discreet and prudent equilibrium between good 
and evil. On the contrary, it is partial, frankly and vigorously so, in [sic] behalf of what is true 
and right.”62 
Such a view of history was not wholly unique in Michelet’s time, particularly among 
liberal romantic historians. Gossman notes that “Writing history in that literate age was a way of 
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practicing politics.”63 History had yet to become a concrete discipline with a methodological 
orientation towards objectivity, and was still intimately connected with rhetoric and politics, 
particularly before 1848 threw many liberal historians’ basic assumptions about nationality and 
class into doubt.64 Gossman points out that the work of many early-19th-century French 
historians, including Prosper de Barante, “was written consciously as part of the liberal campaign 
against the reactionary regimes of the 1820s.”65 
That said, Michelet was also intensely preoccupied with recreating the past accurately. 
He was incredibly attentive to the modes of historical representation that he employed. And 
while those modes often included soaring rhetoric and now-incredible generalizations, Michelet 
never saw them as a departure from an assiduous dedication to historical fidelity. He served from 
1830 to 1852 as Director of the Historical Section of the National Archives, and Edward Kaplan 
writes that Michelet was “among the first to use original sources—such as manuscripts—to 
correct contemporary chronicles upon which most historical writing was then based.”66 Michelet, 
it would seem, saw little contradiction in combining primary source research with a self-
acknowledged subjectivity. To him and many of his romantic colleagues, combining historical 
fact with a properly elaborated moral, philosophical, and political worldview was part and parcel 
of being an engaged citizen.67 While his work was regarded by later 19th-century positivistic 
historians as “sloppy and sourceless,”68 it seems that this critique of partiality stemmed not 
purely from his research, but also from his self-aware but subjective style, which Barthes notes 
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“is precisely that kind of concerted navigation which brings side by side, like a shark and its 
prey, History and its narrator.”69  
This understanding of the historian’s obligation to consult primary documents was not yet 
ubiquitous, although it would quickly become so as newer schools of historical thought emerged, 
namely the source-based methodology of Ranke, who himself had an amicable professional 
relationship with Michelet.70 Indeed, despite his dedication to seeking out primary sources, 
Michelet was sometimes critiqued by rivals for inadequate use or presentation of his materials. 
The socialist journalist Louis Blanc, who sparred with Michelet in the 1840s over the proper 
historical interpretation of the French Revolution,71 critiqued Michelet for sloppy sourcing. 
Gossman recounts that, in a note to his readers intended as a dig at his rival’s methodology, 
Blanc insisted that “the historian cite all his authorities and discuss and compare their testimonies 
before the reader, who must in the end judge them”72—a practice that Michelet evidently 
neglected.  
Methodological scruples aside, Michelet often took pains to distinguish his history as 
factual, separate from literature or poetry. However, he often employed literary and poetic 
rhetorical tactics to communicate this very separation. Indeed, he went as far as to respond 
directly to critiques of his work as overly literary by establishing a stark divide between literature 
and history, and taking pains to place himself on the historical side of that dichotomy. “I should 
observe how much my history, so glibly accused of being ‘poetry,’ of being ‘passion,’ has on the 
contrary retained its solidity and lucidity, even in emotional areas,” he wrote in the 1869 preface 
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to the History of France.73 He went on to say that “it is the fact that the historical method is often 
the opposite of specifically literary art.”74 This is, he explains, is because “the writer… almost 
always likes to surprise… is happy if the natural event appears miraculous.”75 This depiction of 
literary work as foregrounding the miraculous nature of historical events is diametrically 
opposed to the work of the historian, whose “special mission is to explain whatever appears 
miraculous, to surround it with the precedents and circumstances leading up to it, to bring it back 
to nature.”76  
 Michelet’s divide is clear: literature works to sensationalize events, while history works 
to show how those events occur in their temporal context. Such a divide, however, becomes less 
clear in Michelet’s writing itself—Barthes claims that “it is not excessive to speak of a veritable 
hermeneutics of the Micheletist text.”77 His 1831 Introduction to World History is rich with 
metaphorical language and grandiose declarations. For example, when discussing European 
society in the middle ages, he wrote: “All around roars the fatal world of paganism, grimacing in 
a thousand equivocal figures of hideous beasts, while at foot barbarian warriors stay petrified in 
the attitude which surprised them, the enchantment of the Christian word; eternity will not 
suffice to bring them back.”78 This is typical of Michelet’s rhetorical style, which only becomes 
more elevated as he progresses to discussing France and the French people’s unique role in 
history: “France acts and reasons; decrees and fights; she moves the world; she makes history 
and tells it.”79 Even in his choice of primary texts and authors, Michelet veers toward the literary. 
He mentions the English romantic poet Lord Byron nearly a half-dozen times in World History, 
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quoting him on multiple occasions. Invoking John Milton, (and perhaps hinting at the staunch 
anticlericalism he would express later in his career), he likens liberty, the attainment of which 
constitutes his primary goal and telos of history, to Satan’s famous declaration in Paradise Lost: 
“Evil, be my good!”80  
 Critics after Michelet seized upon the opposition between substance and the style in his 
histories—that is, when they examined his work at all. The 1911 edition of the Encyclopedia 
Britannica, for example, noted that Michelet “has not received much recent attention from critics 
and monographers,”81 and mentioned “The idiosyncrasy and literary power of the writer… but 
also… the peculiar visionary qualities which made Michelet the most stimulating, but the most 
untrustworthy (not in fact, which he never consciously falsifies, but in suggestion) of all 
historians.”82 To future professional historians, Michelet’s dedication to sources could not 
eclipse the way he used literary techniques to fashion out of those sources a suggestive and 
subjective historical narrative. 
 In his own time, Michelet himself offered a response to (unnamed) critics of this 
embellished writing style in his 1869 Preface, writing that “At that time [of Introduction to 
World History] I was an artist and a writer, much more than an historian.”83 Even here, however, 
he could not resist a rhetorical flourish: “My first pages after the July Revolution, written on the 
burning cobblestones, were a vision of the world, of World History, as freedom’s struggle.”84 
This self-criticism does little to explain or defend his florid, lucid style. 
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 Indeed, the conflict between prosaic description and poetic meaning-making is the central 
tension of Michelet’s conception of history. How is one to balance dedication to the facts with 
the goal of depicting the past vividly? Michelet offered his own answer: “Prose is the final form 
of thought, that which is the most estranged from vague and inactive reverie, which is closer to 
action. The passage from mute symbolism to poetry, from poetry to prose, is a progress towards 
the egality of enlightenment; it’s an intellectual leveling.”85 In Michelet’s view, poetry must bow 
to prose, as it did in his later works. The process of “intellectual leveling” that he described also 
speaks to an idea that, per historian Arthur Mitzman, Michelet held for much of his life: 
education (via prose) could function as a sort of secular religion, instilling in all citizens of 
France a love of country and its liberal values.86 Mitzman writes that “he and his contemporaries 
saw his educational missions—via his chair at the Collège de France and his widely read 
books—more as that of a prophet than a pedagogue.”87 
This conception of prose as ideological-educational echoes the role Michelet and his 
contemporaries envisioned for France on the world stage. Prose was clearly the form best-suited 
for Michelet’s history, especially as it was intended to express the libertarian fervor of the French 
Revolution, which was the model for future expansions of liberty. Michelet said as much 
directly: “The democratic genius of our nation appears nowhere better than in its eminently 
prosaic character, and it is further by that that she is destined to elevate the entire world of 
intelligence to equality.”88 Ultimately, the use of prose, as opposed to poetry, emerges as a 
nationalistic moral imperative. 
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 How is it that Michelet, whose own discursive style stretches any contemporary 
definition of prosaic, defended his writing as not only documentary but indeed as anti-poetic? 
Hayden White offers an answer to this question in his analysis of Michelet’s historical 
consciousness, which posits history as possessing a “romantic” plot, which is represented via 
metaphorical comparisons of historical events to one another. White’s analysis allows us to 
consider Michelet’s own historical explanations as prosaic in the sense that they seek to present 
historical fact, but poetic in how they present that fact as part of a broader historiographical 
narrative, which might be termed history’s “plot.”  
While Michelet’s literary writing style brought him into disfavor89 among the “scientific” 
historians who were emerging by the end of his life,90 his writing nevertheless displays a vivid 
sense of the possibilities of history and historical writing, even if it lacks, to the present-day 
reader, a serious sense of its own position within history. Famous 20th-century literary critic 
Edmund Wilson, for one, “came to admire Michelet as a historian to whom the writing of history 
had been a way of acting on history.”91 As the following summary of White’s work on Michelet 
shows, it is this self-awareness of the nature of his historical writing that makes Michelet’s work 
all but useless to modern European historiography in its substance, but fascinating to modern 
historiography in its style and methodology. 
White on Michelet: History as Romance, Represented via Metaphor 
In Metahistory, White focuses on Michelet’s historical consciousness in a chapter 
subtitled “Historical Realism as Romance.”92 In recapitulating White’s analysis here, I intend to 
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outline how Michelet’s presentation of history, taken on its own terms, is entirely specious by 
modern disciplinary standards, even though it went on to influence a whole school of modern 
historical thought and historiographical criticism in the Annales school. This analysis will also 
provide a concrete, history-focused model for the sort of historiographical and tropological 
critical analysis that I will apply to novelists and novels in the following two chapters. 
White first establishes Michelet as one of the “undisputed masters of nineteenth-century 
[European] historiography”93 and lays out a list of 19th-century historical works which “still 
serve as the models of modern historical accomplishment,” over one-third of which are by 
Michelet.94 White proceeds to explain what it means to possess a “Romantic” historical 
consciousness. Namely, the Romanticist historian “repudiated all formal systems of explanation 
and tried to gain an explanatory effect by utilizing the Metaphorical mode to describe the 
historical field and the mythos of Romance to represent its processes.”95  
 Key in this explanation is White’s invocation of the “mythos” of romance. It is this 
appeal to mythos that replaces all formal systems of explanation; in place of a causal or positivist 
explanatory framework for history, Michelet grafted historical events onto a pre-apprehended 
romantic plot structure. As a narrative form, romance is “symbolized by the hero’s transcendence 
of the world of experience, his victory over it, and his final liberation from it.”96 Michelet viewed 
history a priori as the story of liberation from the circumstances of history, the arrival of human 
civilization at a kind of presupposed social unity that, to Michelet, was best epitomized by the 
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French peuple’s struggle to realize the republican dream of the early years of the French 
Revolution.97 This constitutes Michelet’s “plot” of history.  
 Historical events are put within this narrative framework via the mode of metaphor, or 
the characterization of phenomena “in terms of their similarity to, and difference from, one 
another.”98 Michelet saw historical events as unique on their own terms, but ultimately as 
“identifications of the one essence which is both the substance of history and the cause in whose 
name Michelet worked as a historian”99—that substance being the romantic, revolutionary plot 
structure of human history.  
Additionally, White notes that “For him [Michelet], a poetic sensibility, critically self-
conscious, provided the accesses to a specifically ‘realistic’ apprehension of the world.”100 This 
poetic sensibility was what enabled for Michelet the metaphorical “symbolic fusion of the 
different entities occupying the historical field.”101 Of note here is White’s claim that Michelet’s 
Metaphorical mode of describing historical events necessitated a self-consciously poetic 
sensibility; in other words, explaining history in a self-consciously “realistic” way required a 
literary, rather than scientific or purely mimetic, mode of representation. 
 Despite this self-conscious use of what might be termed subjective explanatory and 
descriptive techniques, White maintains that Michelet possessed a “frank and vigorous partiality 
for the right and the truth.”102 As the head of the historical section of the National Archives under 
the July Monarchy, Michelet was no stranger to, nor enemy of, source-based history. Yet, as the 
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identification of the “right” with the “truth” implies, Michelet’s historical accuracy is not what 
makes his work problematic to contemporary historians; that is instead due to his nakedly 
ideological—and consequently quickly anachronistic—historical narratives. Cultural and literary 
historian Bettina Lerner notes that “Indeed, the transformation of the historical and contingent 
into the natural and necessary is undeniably one of the processes that shape Michelet’s Histoire 
de France.”103 What a historian makes of the facts, rather than the apprehension of the facts 
themselves, is what renders their story more or less true. Or, as White puts it, “Michelet 
recognized that the historian must take up a position pro or contra the forces at play in different 
acts of the historical drama.”104  
 The combination of Michelet’s devotion to the facts and his insistence on marshaling 
those facts towards an often un-rigorous and transparently motivated historiographical narrative 
exhibits a sophisticated understanding that history is at the same time a project for excavating 
fact and a project for creating a narrative, with all its attendant ideological and political stances. 
Indeed, it is precisely this understanding that engendered a critical reevaluation of Michelet’s 
philosophy of history in the 20th century, rehabilitating him as the “model and inspiration for the 
founders of the influential Annales school of historians in France.”105 As with the novelists 
examined in the following two chapters, it is precisely Michelet’s poetic sensibility that creates, 
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Conclusion 
Gossman offers a clear summation of Michelet’s position vis-à-vis the then-burgeoning 
practice of history:  
Michelet's approach to history was not and could not be that of the modern professional. 
The social and institutional basis of the discipline of history as we know it today—large 
numbers of students and immense universities, tens of thousands of professionally trained 
specialists, innumerable scholarly journals—did not yet exist, and the writer of history 
was still, as Michelet's reading and formation indicate, a man of letters in the old 
eighteenth-century sense of the term.106 
Michelet possessed an understanding of history which, although it included a then-novel 
dedication to primary source analysis, had a very different point of departure than present-day 
history.107  
 Nevertheless, an examination of Michelet’s writing and professional trajectory provides 
two important insights into the relationship between historical “fact” and historical “truth” in his 
lifetime. First, Michelet’s literary sensibility, and his self-awareness of this sensibility, 
demonstrate that before the professionalization of history began in earnest, historians were quite 
attentive to questions of rhetoric and style; Michelet even felt the need to stake a clear position 
on these questions. Second, Michelet demonstrates a clear awareness that historical “truth” is, in 
the last analysis, a subjective idea, one that is made and remade by every historian in every 
historical work. This nuanced understanding of history’s social function and socio-cultural origin 
is an understanding that we will see echoed by realist writer Honoré de Balzac, and then all but 
abandoned by Émile Zola, the last prominent realist. 
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Chapter 2: Honoré de Balzac, The Human Comedy, and the Social Real 
“So the fact is no longer anything in itself, it is wholly in the idea others form of it” 
—Balzac, Lost Illusions108/109 
 Honoré de Balzac died in 1850, too early to bear witness to the debate over what his work 
represented for the development of the realist novel. Best known for his fiction cycle “La 
Comédie Humaine” (“The Human Comedy”), which includes some 90-odd works of fiction, 
Balzac has emerged posthumously as the consensus representative of French realism. His works 
were derived from the observation and representation of the daily lives of French elites and non-
elites, in contrast to the melodramatic works of contemporary French romanticists such as 
François-René de Chateaubriand and Victor Hugo, the latter of whom admired Balzac and 
eulogized him at his funeral. Consequently, his writing has been taken by some as accurately 
representative of the past, especially before realism was attacked by Barthes and other critics. 
Friedrich Engels, for one, “claimed to have learned more about French society and its history 
from Balzac ‘than from all the professed historians, economists and statisticians of the period 
together.’”110  
That Balzac is hailed as a capable documentarian by a Marxist, despite being publicly 
committed to reactionary royalist politics, is a testament to his perceived ability to accurately 
present French society in a way even more real than, per Engels, any kind of academic research. 
Consequently, it is clear that Balzac possessed a specific historical consciousness, a specific way 
of looking at and depicting the post-Revolution “past” in which many of his works were set, 
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which merits examination; the ways in which Balzac thought about the past, and represented it 
on the page, provide significant insight into the interplay between subjective narrative stories and 
“factual” history in the early-to-mid 19th century. 
 As Engels’s preoccupation with Balzac indicates, his work has been hailed by Marxists as 
a damning indictment of bourgeois culture and modes of production (a critique that came from 
Balzac’s monarchist conservatism rather than from any progressive impulse). His work has also 
been claimed by Sandy Petrey as an illustration of the wholly constructed nature of social reality. 
These analyses each present a different sort of Balzac, with a different conception of what, 
exactly, he was communicating in his works—is Balzac a social critic, or perhaps even a 
historical materialist or dialectician? How has Balzac’s corpus been interpreted in so many 
disparate ways? Balzac, unlike Zola, did not write about his writing, or about the theory of the 
novel; the closest he comes to any self-criticism is his foreword to The Human Comedy, which I 
will examine later. Consequently, I believe that the best way to arrive at a coherent 
understanding of Balzac’s implicit theoretical stance towards the novel and towards history is 
through a comparison of these divergent critical analyses. 
 In this chapter, I argue that various critics’ disparate and sometimes conflicting analyses 
of Balzac’s work as succeeding or failing to be accurately “representational” are reconcilable 
through an examination of Balzac’s historical consciousness as “integrationist,” which White 
defines as using narrative “in such a way as to depict the consolidation or crystallization, out of a 
set of apparently dispersed events, of some integrated entity whose importance is greater than 
that of any of the individual entities analyzed or described in the course of the narrative.”111 To 
Balzac, historical forces existed in a coherent and definite whole as social forces. The role of the 
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novelist, as Balzac saw it, was to record those forces via fictive works, and use that fiction to 
uncover and perhaps critique them. Ultimately, the particular representation of historical forces 
in the novel could accurately capture and reflect those forces in the real world, both cataloguing 
and explaining them, even though this is done through fiction. The novel, in other words, models 
the historical field in creating “a wide space within which hundreds of accidents may intersect 
each other and yet in their aggregate produce fateful necessities.”112 While events are imagined, 
they take as their inspiration the same social forces that exist in the real world, and are thus 
accurately representative of these social historical forces.113 What critics have done in 
interpreting Balzac’s works is explicate various aspects of Balzac’s thinking about history: 
Lukács, for example, highlights Balzac’s holistic view of history, while Petrey highlights his 
attention to its constative social nature, and Émile Zola, claiming Balzac as his literary 
predecessor, focused on his use of real-world observation in creating compelling characters.114 
Just as various critics have attended to distinct aesthetic and ideological aspects of 
Balzac’s work, all of which are parts of Balzac’s larger conception of history and social 
“reality,” I argue that Balzac’s work is itself rooted in an integrationist consciousness: each part 
of the social and historical whole exists in and for itself, but is most important to what White 
calls “uncovering the integrative structures and processes which… represent the fundamental 
modes of history.”115 I make this argument in two ways. First, I survey and compare secondary 
writing on Balzac from various theorists, critics, and historians of literature, and demonstrate 
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how an integrationist historical consciousness can reconcile the various critical “Balzacs” that 
emerge. And second, I analyze the foreword to The Human Comedy as a formal expression of 
integrationist thinking in Balzac’s own words. What these works show is that Balzac’s primary 
intervention in the history of the novel insofar as it applies to the practice of history is the 
realization that, as he writes in Lost Illusions, history, like all narrative, exists in the last analysis 
as “wholly in the idea others form of it”—but that is not any less of a real and urgent task as a 
result. Indeed, it is the translation from concrete, formal manifestation to general idea that, to 
Balzac, constitutes the practice of history. 
The Many Balzacs 
 As the preeminent French realist, Balzac and his corpus have been the subject of a vast 
amount of past and contemporary scholarship. More specifically, critics from myriad schools of 
thought have examined Balzac’s practice of literary “realism” and its connection to extra-textual 
reality. Many of these critiques, although convincing in their analyses and forcefully argued on 
their own terms, are all but incompatible in their assumptions, analyses, and ultimate 
implications regarding Balzac’s historical consciousness. 
 Roland Barthes, for example, uses Balzac’s novella Sarrasine as the primary evidence for 
his condemnation of literary realism in his 1970 essay S/Z. Sarrasine, published in 1830, can be 
read as story of gender panic: after encountering a decrepit stranger at a Parisian ball, the 
narrator writes that this mysterious figure “was simply an old man.”116 The tale then becomes a 
story-within-a-story, with the narrator recounting this old man’s life to a companion: at an 
unspecified point in the past, this “man” had gone by the woman’s name “la Zambinella,” and 
was a glamorous opera singer—later revealed to be a castrato—in Rome prior to their arrival in 
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Paris; this character is introduced in the text as “la prima donna” and referred to exclusively 
using feminine pronouns.117 In the story-within-the-story, la Zambinella is only referred to with 
feminine pronouns, while in the present narration, the old “man” is described with masculine 
ones. 
Barthes takes these two naming references, which lack an unequivocal objective referent 
since the person they describe is not truly defined by either possible signifier, as proof of the 
impossibly of objective representation in realist prose. “Here, the discourse is misleading the 
reader,”118 he writes of the character’s introduction as an old man. Consequently, he argues, 
Sarrasine’s failure to name this main character in an ontologically consistent manner “makes it 
impossible to assume that realist prose actually allows readers to see through it to the world 
beyond.”119 Balzac, then, is the unwitting agent of realism’s destruction; his prose subtly undoes 
its capacity to represent any extra-textual “real.” By extension, one may argue, Balzac’s 
conception of history, regardless of what it is, may be similarly self-defeating: how can any 
written narrative be considered a “true story” when representational prose can only ever draw 
attention to the fact that “representation can never depict anything except its own artifices”?120  
 Sandy Petrey, by contrast, has argued that the old man’s/la Zambinella’s fluctuation 
between two gendered social roles amounts to an “insistence that language is at one and the same 
time independent of objective reality and inextricable from social reality”121—that Balzac’s 
prose in fact works by “denying language’s connection to objective truth and affirming its 
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expression of social truth.”122/123 In short, the shifts in gender presentation that the main character 
undergoes throughout the book demonstrate an understanding that gender signifiers—or any 
signifiers, for that matter—derive their referential power solely from their social, intersubjective 
function. It is true, as Barthes claims, that Balzac’s prose cannot be taken as representative of an 
objective world outside of language. But such an analysis, per Petrey, still permits a reading of 
Balzac’s prose as representative, not because it gets to the world beyond language, but because 
social reality is created in and through language; what is considered “real” is the function and 
product, not the precondition, of referential language. 
 It is not a stretch to connect such an analysis to a consideration of historical 
consciousness, and Petrey does so explicitly. Rather than emphasizing the significance of 
historical events qua actual events, Petrey claims, “the significant point of Balzac’s prose is how 
a collectivity represents what happened.”124 Balzac’s conception of history’s purpose, then, is 
not rooted in any vision of the historical record as actually documentary, but rather of history as 
a sort of signifier: historical allusions become “constituents of a precise social environment most 
succinctly designated through chronological coordinates that are themselves ideologically 
active.”125 Balzac does not deny or negate history, as Barthes’s position seems to imply, but 
instead assigns history a socio-ideological function. Historical events matter not because they 
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happened, but because the very notion of a common definition of a “historical event” is 
significant. Such an understanding implies a common social and ideological understanding of 
“history,” which is the constative base upon which historical narratives claim real-world 
relevance. Historical events are given meaning in and through the linguistic and social context in 
which they are represented—this context determines how history is received, how it functions 
ideologically, and what it ultimately “means.” Sarrasine is, in Petrey’s final analysis, “a readerly 
narrative of how meaning functions in history despite its wholly spurious grounds for doing 
so.”126 
 Whereas Barthes has attacked Balzac’s realism as self-negating, and Petrey has attempted 
to rehabilitate Balzac’s realism as a depiction of the contingent, constative nature of “reality,” the 
Marxist critic György Lukács offers a more straightforward appreciation of Balzac’s realism. 
Lukács, whose broad sensitivity to the phenomenology of history and its ideological implications 
makes him uniquely insightful in this context, does not analyze Balzac’s system of verbal 
representation, but instead claims Balzac to be a trenchant critic of the bourgeois milieu he 
inhabited, as well as its social-economic base. Balzac’s Lost Illusions, to Lukács, “shows how 
the conception of life of those living in a bourgeois society—a conception which although false, 
is yet necessarily what it is127—is shattered by the brute forces of capitalism.”128 Lukács’s Balzac 
is not amenable to structural or speech-act analytical lenses. Rather, he is a direct chronicler of 
social life whose unique intelligence and literary faculty allowed him to “[depict] man and 
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society as complete entities, instead of showing merely one or other of their aspects.”129 
Ultimately, Lukács’s Balzac fulfills what the critic identifies as the aesthetic and ideological goal 
of literary realism: “the adequate presentation of the complete human personality.”130 Whereas 
the French romantic authors’ protagonists were singular in their individual feats, Balzac’s realist 
characters become exceptional through their social lives; the shift towards this new goal and 
style, which was epitomized if not singlehandedly precipitated by Balzac, is what Lukács sees as 
his primary intervention in the history of the novel. 
 Lukács’s Balzac is, in the main, “the historian of private life under the restoration and the 
July monarchy.”131 Such a claim, like Petrey’s, is not wanting for a corresponding conception of 
Balzac’s historical consciousness. But whereas Petrey identifies Balzac’s historical 
consciousness in the author’s textual invocation of the constative nature of social relations, 
Lukács locates it in “the inexorable veracity with which he depicted reality even if that reality 
ran counter to his own personal opinions, hopes and wishes.”132 It is because Balzac is able to 
accurately represent social forces in literary form—problems of representation 
notwithstanding—that he arrives in his fiction at what Lukács identifies as ontologically accurate 
conclusions (which, given Lukács’s Marxist bent, are always the identification of the 
fundamental dialectical contradictions driving the development and eventual end of capitalism).  
Lukács makes this point in a passage worth quoting in full: 
“It is this quality of Balzacian realism, the fact that it is solidly based on a correctly 
interpreted social existence, that makes Balzac an unsurpassed master in depicting the 
great intellectual and spiritual forces which form all human ideologies. He does so by 
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tracing them back to their social origins and making them function in the direction 
determined by those social origins.”133 
Balzac’s authorial genius lies in his ability to accurately identify and trace the roots of 
social existence in their historical continuity—in other words, in his ability to conceive of and 
represent the world around him in terms of change over time, showing how the social present 
emerged from the social past. In short, my survey of Balzac criticism has found that whereas 
Barthes’s Balzac is essentially naïve, and Petrey’s Balzac is a social constructivist, Lukács’s 
Balzac is more-or-less a Marxist historian.  
The three “Balzacs” we have met are very different: Lukács celebrates Balzac for what 
Barthes claims Balzac can never truly accomplish (representing the true nature of reality on the 
page), and what Petrey claims is anathema to what Balzac is actually doing (representing the 
constative nature of reality). These very different “Balzacs” are not so opposed as they initially 
seem if considered not as opposed critical stances, but as different expressions of a single 
“Balzac” whose unique representational techniques are notable precisely because they are 
sympathetic to such a wide array of analyses. That so many different Balzacs exist in criticism is 
no accident; Balzac’s work was always conceived of as functioning within a part-whole network: 
just as his novels are parts of a cycle of fictional works, each aspect of his novels might be 
analyzed on its own terms. Such an isolated analysis neglects that works in The Human Comedy 
were not truly intended to be standalone; what each work individually addresses is only part of 
the social and historical truths expressed by the broader project. Accordingly, understanding 
Balzac’s theory of history requires us to think as he did: in terms of parts and wholes, in terms of 
integrating separate ideas, narratives, and viewpoints into a single conceptual framework. 
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Balzac as Integrationist 
 The way we might assimilate these different “Balzacs” into a single, coherent “Balzac” 
with a single, coherent historical consciousness is via the same framework that I argue Balzac 
himself writes within: an integrationist, synecdochical one. I borrow this idea from White, who 
terms such a framework an “Organicist”134 mode of explanation. White identifies Ranke as the 
19th-century historian who wrote in such a framework, and his description of Ranke’s conception 
of history might consequently be used to summarize Balzac’s: “Ranke dealt not in ‘laws’ but in 
the discovery of ‘Ideas’ of the agents and agencies which he viewed as inhabitants of the 
historical field.” These ‘Ideas’ are presupposed to ‘exist in a kind of harmonious condition’ as a 
“completed structure,”135 a coherent set of historical forces. This is the conception from which 
White derives the “Organicist” label: the coherent set of historical forces, conceptualized as 
ideas, forms an organically “real,” or essential, set of historical processes, one which is to be 
elaborated, not constructed, through the responsible disciplinary practice of history. 
 Let us consider, then, each of the foregoing critical presentations of Balzac as separate 
“Ideas” about Balzac that exist in a “harmonious condition,” to use White’s term. Barthes’s 
treatment of Balzac amounts to a critique of Balzac’s inability to represent the real world in 
prose. This critique might be assimilated into an integrated understanding of a single “Balzac” by 
understanding it as part of Balzac’s conception of history as a necessarily narrative form: like 
Ranke, Balzac’s view of history was not that of the “naïve empiricist,”136 as Barthes assumes, but 
rather the view that “the highest kind of explanation to which history might aspire was that of a 
narrative description of the historical process.”137 Balzac’s work does not even attempt to do 
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what Barthes accuses it of doing, because Balzac, in Sarrasine or any other work, did not strive 
for a true elaboration of concrete history but rather the elaboration of an “Idea,” of a real, but 
abstract, historical force. His realist prose did not attempt to explicate a “true” reality via a “true” 
story, but rather to expose, via coherent narrative, the coherent “Ideas” that create reality by 
particularizing them in a plausible, realistic (as opposed to real) way. These particular stories do 
not have to represent the world beyond the text, but rather to show history as “a field of formal 
coherences, the ultimate or final unity of which could be suggested by analogy to the nature of 
the parts.”138 The important takeaway from Barthes’s critique, then, is that these parts function 
allegorically, rather than referentially—but are nonetheless useful in identifying of the laws of 
history. Indeed, one could argue that the narrative coherence of the novelistic form is itself a 
model of the organicist, integrationist view of history as “an achieved system of relationships 
which itself is no longer conceived to change.”139 
 This analysis of Barthes’s contribution to our understanding of Balzac’s historical 
consciousness expresses essentially the same view as Petrey’s, albeit from a diametrically 
opposed starting point. Whereas Barthes starts from a critique of Balzac as unable to get at 
anything “real,” and arrives at an understanding of Balzac’s prose as tacitly allegorical, Petrey 
starts from an understanding of Balzac as getting at the only true “real”—the social real—to 
arrive at the same. 
 Lukács, for his part, would seem to contradict the above contributions to our 
understanding of Balzac, since he assumes Balzac to be getting at the objectively “true” nature of 
reality (this truth being the dialectical development of human society). However, Lukács’s 
analysis of this critical efficacy does not actually conflict with the view that Balzac’s work, like 
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Balzac himself, takes history as a fundamentally ideological and allegorical pursuit. Lukács 
writes that an “overall conception of the process of capitalist evolution enabled Balzac to 
uncover the great social and economic forces which govern historical development, although he 
never does so in direct fashion.”140 The fictive, narrative character of Balzac’s prose is what 
prevents it from being “direct.” But it is precisely the constructed, coherent narrative arcs of his 
characters that reveal these “great social and economic forces” which Lukács believed to be 
themselves coherent in a dialectical fashion. 
 This same idea can also be understood via Lukács’s claim that “Balzac dissolves all 
social relationships into a network of personal clashes of interests, objective conflicts between 
individuals, webs of intrigue, etc.”141 These social relationships, which Lukács might consider 
“organic” and real, find their representation in the personal, “objective” conflicts that Balzac 
represents. Once again, although these putatively “objective” conflicts are fictive, they 
nevertheless represent the dissolution, or perhaps the distillation, of real systems of relations. 
Additionally, the dissolution of these macro social relations into intensely personal conflicts 
buttresses our understanding of Balzac as writing via synecdoche, using social parts to stand in 
for social wholes. 
 Lukács, philosopher of history that he was, comes the closest to expressing the formally 
integrationist nature of Balzac’s consciousness. He observes that Balzac “can demonstrate 
concretely, in any detached episode of the social process, the great forces that govern its 
course.”142 Put otherwise, Balzac’s concrete-yet-fictional social tableaus are ultimately 
expressions of real-world social processes. It is, Lukács claims, “precisely by stripping the social 
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institutions of their apparent objectivity and seemingly dissolving them into personal 
relationships, [that] the author contrives to express what is truly objective in them.”143 This 
trenchant analysis gets to the very core of Balzac’s conception of history: broad, coherent social 
forces (even if they are not the Marxian material forces that Lukács identifies) exist. The 
responsibility and potential of the novel, then, lies in showing or modeling how these general 
forces might be particularized, in the service of helping the reader to understand them as social-
historical forces. Lukács, like Barthes and Petrey, ultimately arrives at the conclusion that it is 
precisely because of the constructed nature of Balzac’s narratives that they so insightfully 
identify the driving forces behind real-world events.  
Considering Barthes, Petrey, and Lukács as consonant, rather than dissonant, reveals that all 
three critiques can be accepted simultaneously if one assumes that Balzac’s true historical 
consciousness—his sense of the relationship between narrative and truth—lies in his 
identification of generally true laws (or what Balzac, at least, assumed to be true laws) via 
particularly untrue stories. Ultimately, Balzac might best be positioned as a historical objectivist 
and constructivist at the same time: he believes that definitive historical laws and processes exist, 
even as he demonstrates that their manifestation, like all historical events, is constructed 
intersubjectively; that is to say that “history” is performed and interpreted between individuals 
whose actions and their effects occur within subjective networks. 
 White writes that Balzac “saw history as educating men to the fact that their own present 
world had once existed in the minds of men as an unknown and frightening future, but how, as a 
consequence of specific human decisions, this future had been transformed into a present.”144 In 
other words, and as the critics have shown, Balzac saw history as a broad field with social (e.g., 
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presentist) implications. By showing how the future is constructed socially, Balzac implicitly 
demonstrates that the past was (and is) also constructed socially. It is precisely the process of this 
social construction which is the coherent set of historical “Ideas” that might be elaborated via 
narrative. And this is why Balzac can be considered a “creative historian”145 without that term 
being self-contradictory: his made-up stories are models of the social construction of meaning, 
models of how storytelling constructs the present and the future in an ideologically active 
manner. It is this act of construction that is the true, narrative, and organically “real” process of 
history. 
Integrationist Realism in The Human Comedy 
 Much of Balzac’s historical consciousness, his conception of history as an integrated 
field of constructed coherences that can be described via narrative, finds expression in his 
foreword to The Human Comedy, and indeed in the structure of The Human Comedy itself. As 
Victor Hugo said of the massive work at Balzac’s funeral: “All his books form but one book, a 
living, luminous, profound book, where one sees all our contemporary civilization coming and 
going and marching and moving with all manner of the bewildering and terrible, mixed with the 
real. A marvelous book which the poet entitled comedy and which he could have entitled 
history.”146 Balzac himself would likely have agreed with such a description: he wrote in his 
foreword to the work that his “favorable system” for the project was to “relate his compositions 
to one another in such a manner to coordinate a complete history, where each chapter was a 
novel, and each novel an epoch.”147 Just as Hugo described, Balzac sees his œuvre as one that 
should be read as a single work, in which every novel is a part to be integrated into the larger, 
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formally coherent whole. His works model a system of relationships similar to that which he sees 
in history: a coherent and complete structure which in its totality “comprehends at the same time 
the history and the critique of Society,”148 even though it is, on its face, a set of imagined stories.  
 There is a certain formal unity achieved here: to present a history of capital-S “Society,” 
which he understands as a coherent network of social-historical forces, Balzac creates a coherent 
network of stories populated by unique and memorable characters. Peter Brooks notes that 
“every time one of these characters enters one of the many tales that make up The Human 
Comedy, he or she is given a biography, sometimes a few lines, in the case of the minor figures, 
but often several paragraphs or even pages.”149 The Human Comedy is a web of individual stories 
colliding with one another with sometimes predictable and sometimes wildly unexpected results. 
But, as Balzac holds, “Thus depicted, Society should carry within it the reasoning of its 
actions.”150 By understanding society as a matrix of individual narratives, Balzac claims to hold 
the key to understanding the historical metanarrative of “Society” itself. This is why, as Brooks 
observes, “Balzac needs to situate his people; showing how their personal histories are related to 
the history of the nation at a given moment is crucial.”151 The coherent, macro-level forces of 
history, of social life, can only be understood by recourse to the individuals who collectively act 
out the events that constitute the historical field, and who later construct a consensus narrative of 
those events which is termed “history.” Or, as Balzac wrote, “French society was going to be the 
historian, I should be nothing but the secretary.”152 
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 Therein lies the core of Balzac’s philosophy of history. By understanding how a vast cast 
of characters interacts to create compelling fictive narratives, Balzac arrives at an organic, 
holistic construction of a moment in time, in this case Restoration-era France. One could even 
argue that he models how real-world actors collectively construct historical narratives which 
come to be understood as objectively true. And, having depicted this society accurately, Balzac 
is able to furnish insight into the broader “Ideas” that drive it—to, as Hugo said, mix his fiction 
with the real, so that the reader of The Human Comedy is given a comprehensive overview of 
contemporary French social life, along with the forces that drive it. 
Also notable is that the foreword to The Human Comedy was published in 1842, some 
thirteen years after the project had begun, by Balzac’s own admission.153 (Works published 
before this date were retconned into the project). The act of entitling The Human Comedy over a 
decade after its quasi-official start can itself be taken as a historical act, wrangling previous 
works—previous events, if one takes Balzac’s fictional universe seriously—into an officially 
coherent narrative ex post facto. Such a recontextualization should be methodologically familiar 
to any historian. It also shows again how Balzac conceives of narrative in historical terms, or 
rather of history in narrative terms: events can be put into formally coherent groups because 
history and the social world are prefigured as formally coherent; constructing and revealing the 
“Ideas” guiding history are essentially identical actions.  
Balzac’s conception of history as a social practice, one of description-via-storytelling that 
is more important for its intersubjective function than its documentary potential, is shown again 
the end of his foreword: “I… give to my work the title under which it appears today: The Human 
Comedy. Is this ambitious? Is it not fair? That is what, when the work is finished, the public will 
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decide.”154 As always, in Balzac’s view of history, the meaning and worth of a story is not 
established by its narrator or author, but rather by its listeners. History, like any story, is 
important not for what it is but for the understandings it engenders and the outcomes it 
precipitates. 
Conclusion 
Balzac’s integrationist historical consciousness ultimately positions the task of the 
novelist not as mimetic or objective but rather as representative of subjective social reality, 
which, to Balzac, is the appropriate container for all forms of knowledge, from historical to 
scientific. The novelist then, retains a role that has traditionally been reserved for literature in the 
form of a social critic, while simultaneously reaching beyond the silo of literature to present 
social reality as reality. In the process, Balzac ascribes the writer—and reader—a certain 
historical agency. This historical agency has been interpreted in different ways by different 
thinkers: for Petrey, Balzac’s work uncovers the historical agency of ordinary people by 
uncovering the horizontal social nature of reality and its constructed-ness. for Lukács, Balzac’s 
works are sympathetic to a Marxist reading and functional as “signposts in the ideological battle 
fought for the restoration of the unbroken human personality,”155 and as such are useful in 
understanding and ultimately combatting the ways in which, in bourgeois capitalist culture, “the 
spirit becomes a commodity.”156 For Zola, as we will see in the following chapter, Balzac’s 
methods approach the “experimental” in their verisimilitude, rendering his work useful to the 
human endeavor in the same way as scientific knowledge.  
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These various conceptions of Balzacian realism as a tool for agency and action are all 
defensible on their own terms, but they find their most concise historical articulation in Petrey: 
rather than what actually happened, “the significant point of Balzac’s prose is how a collectivity 
represents what happened.” Writing early in the 19th century, Balzac presented a view of 
history’s social origins and social function, and a sophisticated understanding of the relationship 
between fictional events and historical “truth.” Balzac, who lived through an era of incredible 
political turmoil and constant crises of authority, understood history—both the process and the 
discipline—as the expression of definite forces; he also understood history as an ideologically 
charged narrative. It is the creation and operation of social associations that constitute Balzac’s 
formally coherent historical “truth.”  
While Balzac’s view of history is much less programmatic than Michelet’s, they share the 
understanding that narratives of the past, and their impact, are subjective constructions. For both 
of them, the past’s importance to the present lies in the social possibilities that it represents and 
creates. And while Balzac, skeptical of the emerging modern world, was much more pessimistic 
than Michelet, both viewed the study of the past as synthetic: telling and re-telling history is a 
creative process that defines and represents a distinct social group: French society. This notion of 
history was dominant among the pre-1848 liberal bourgeois ruling class, and cohered well with 
the belief that the French people might be constituted as a unified polity based on a common 
subjective orientation towards their country’s history. However, this optimistic view would be all 
but abandoned after 1848, as the French ruling class was forced to confront social fissures that 
emerged and consequently became enamored of positivism and rational approaches to 
knowledge as well as to governing. 
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Balzac’s conception of history as a form of coherent social truth, and of realism as the 
formal expression of that social truth, was not shared by the man widely recognized as the last 
great French realist, Émile Zola. Where Balzac emphasized the social real, which he saw as 
governed by fundamentally human social forces, Zola attempted to apply similar observational, 
memetic, and narrative techniques to a wholly objective positivism. This shift, the following 
chapter argues, is accompanied by a markedly different historical consciousness. Along with the 
discipline of history, French realism evolved across the 19th century, and its idea of what history 

















Chapter 3: Émile Zola, Positivist Realism, and the Novel as Science 
“No one doubts, in the public, the science and the patience that certain authors make use of 
nowadays.” 
—Zola, The Naturalist Novelists157 
 Building on, and in some ways responding directly to, Balzac’s realist style, Émile Zola 
took French literary realism to its positivist extreme. By the end of the 19th century and the start 
of the 20th, Zola had emerged as the best-known writer of a specific variant of realism termed 
“naturalism.” He was popular both domestically and internationally, and one 1923 survey of 
French realist literature published in The New Republic observed that “Everything tended to 
constitute Zola the leader and spokesman of what was now known as Naturalism.”158 
In addition to being its best-known novelist, Zola was the theoretician of naturalism’s 
form, which he dubbed the “experimental novel.” Such a novel, Zola argued, applies scientific 
techniques of experimentation to fiction, so that fiction might be used to gain objective insights 
into the human condition. Zola saw this new function of the novel as a natural progression in the 
field of literature, a part of the inevitable shift of all art towards the scientific method. 
Accordingly, his new formal conception of the novel was a natural outgrowth of, as well as a 
necessary intervention in, both science and art. Zola based his scientific conception of 
experimentation on French physiologist Claude Bernard’s landmark 1865 work An Introduction 
to the Study of Experimental Medicine. However, at the same time, he identified elements of his 
experimental method in Balzac’s writing, and identified him as one of the seminal “Romanciers 
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Naturalistes” [naturalist novelists] along with Stendhal and Gustave Flaubert.159 Zola’s intention 
was that the naturalist novel, building on the innovations of previous novelists, might ultimately 
elide the science-art gap, marrying vivid literary prose with a scientist’s eye for impartial 
observation and description to arrive at an artistic-yet-mechanistic understanding of human 
nature. 
 Zola’s fiction cycle, Les Rougon Macquart, enjoyed great commercial success during the 
final decades of the 19th century. In it, he intended to use hereditary science to trace common 
behaviors across several generations of the Rougon-Macquart family. “Heredity has its laws, like 
gravity,” he wrote in the series’s preface. “Physiologically, they [the Rougon-Macquarts] are the 
slow succession of accidents of nerves and blood… which determine, according to the milieu, 
among each individual of this race, the feelings, desires, passions, all the natural and instinctive 
human manifestations whose products take the names agreed upon as virtues or vices.”160 But 
Zola’s conception of the novel as a formal scientific-literary hybrid, which was laid out explicitly 
in the preface to the first Rougon Macquart novel, failed to find lasting purchase in the French 
literary scene: Maya Balakirsky-Katz notes that “The reception of Zola’s L’Assommoir, the 
seventh Rougon-Macquart novel, published in 1877, set a pattern for the torrent of critical 
hostility from the literary establishment,”161 much of it accusations of sensationalism or of 
aesthetic bankruptcy. 
Nevertheless, Zola’s idea of the experimental, naturalist novel has deep implications for 
his historical consciousness. Rather than defending his work on the grounds that the 
 
159 These are most prominent of the authors Zola identifies as practitioners of the naturalist novel, along with the 
sibling-team of Edmond and Jules de Goncourt and Alsphonse Daudet, in his series of “études” [“studies”] 
published in 1881 as Les Romanciers Naturalistes. 
160 Zola, Preface to The Fortune of the Rougons, 6. 
161 Maya Balakirsky-Katz, “Émile Zola, the Cochonnerie of Naturalist Literature, and the Judensau,” Jewish Social Studies 
13:1 (2006): 113. 
Schuman 55 
experimental novel is partially a work of science and partially a work of art, Zola fuses the two 
entirely: art is in service of science and simultaneously a unique part of science. The novelist is 
not only an artist but a scientist—and, in a sense, a historian, acting upon the recent past as the 
field for experimentation. Zola wrote in the preface to the Rougon Macquart series that “When I 
hold every thread, when I have in my hands an entire social group, I will show this group at 
work, as an actor of a historical epoch.”162 While Zola’s claim to hold a social milieu “in my 
hands” is perhaps too forceful a claim for a historian to make, his intention of using this 
understanding to illuminate the past is a recognizably historical goal. As a result, I consider 
Zola’s conception of history to be twofold. First, history is a set of identifiable events that 
happened in recognizable chronological sequence. Here, the novelist’s duty is straightforward: 
research historical events so that they might be represented as closely as possible to the way they 
might have plausibly occurred.  
 Second, seizing upon Zola’s idea that he might “hold every thread,” I argue that he saw 
history as a set of immutable laws waiting to be identified via controlled experimentation in and 
with history. The novelist-as-experimenter must observe and faithfully represent historical events 
such that their inner logic might be ascertained and put to use in the present. Naturalist fiction 
presents events that, although fictive, should be considered by the reader as equally “true” to 
history because of their plausibility and applicability to rational science. However, as Zola 
explained, this task requires making specific alterations to the historical field, intentionally 
placing characters in various settings and scenarios such that the novelist may have something 
resembling an experimental control group and a variable group. The historical field is prefigured 
as inherently subject to a certain amount of variability; it is in this variability, this ability to 
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construct alternative (fictional) historical contexts and observe how these alterations might play 
out in the lives of fictional characters, that the experimental novel finds its positivistic 
explanatory utility. I argue that this sense of history as contingent in its particularity, yet fixed in 
its outcome, marks the central tension of Zola’s historical consciousness.  
 Zola’s application of scientific methodology and discourses to the theory of the novel and 
its implicit view of history mirrors the broader adoption of rationalist beliefs by French elites. As 
political actors “claimed their authority in the name of ‘modern society’ and progress,”163 the 
self-professed explanatory power of Zola’s own work rested on the application of distinctly 
“modern” methods. Writing in an age of political divisions, Zola’s work attempted to transcend 
those divisions by using them, and their fictional representation, as a way of rationally 
identifying and representing universal, deterministic social laws. Gone was the notion of 
historical or epistemological subjectivity, and in its place was an insistence on the possibility—
indeed the necessity—of an objective view of social relations, the past, and “reality.” 
 The chapter proceeds as follows: first, I discuss Zola’s essay The Experimental Novel, in 
which Zola lays out his theory of literature as a hard science. In this essay lies the basis of Zola’s 
literary-historical epistemology, his view of history as a field upon and within which one can 
both observe and experiment in the service of discovering the true nature of human society. 
Second, I concretize this theory by analyzing Zola’s novel Germinal as a demonstration of 
Zola’s mechanistic, positivistic historical consciousness and authorial method, arguing that the 
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The “Experimental” Novel 
 Before becoming a prolific novelist, Zola had worked as a journalist, and was no stranger 
to primary-source research. Indeed, Germinal is notable for the sizeable documentary archive 
that Zola amassed before writing it. In The Experimental Novel, first published in 1880, he layed 
out his conception of the novel as both the communication of objective knowledge and the site of 
knowledge-generating experimentation itself, implicitly revealing his twofold conception of 
history. Zola’s relentlessly positivistic views on history and the world, made clear in the essay, 
demanded a suitably positivistic formal container where such knowledge could be elaborated and 
communicated. This conception of the novel as both documentary and critical means that the 
novelist is both embedded within and able to act upon history, which is itself conceived of as 
both the source of social knowledge and its experimental proving ground. 
            Zola starts from the blanket assumption that “the naturalist evolution that the century 
carries [out] drives, little by little, all manifestations of human intelligence onto an identical 
scientific path.”164 Literature, to Zola, must be raised to the level of experimental science, so that 
it might exist in a continuum of disciplines which are all generating the same type of knowledge. 
“It’s but a question of degrees on the same path, from chemistry to physiology, then from 
physiology to anthropology and sociology. The experimental novel is at the end [of that path],” 
he writes.165 The novel is not the terminus of experimental science, but it is another tool for the 
generation of objective human knowledge, one with its own specific area of utility. Such a 
reimagining of the function of the novel, of course, requires a reimagining of how literature 
operates, and of how the novel is to be written as “experimental.” 
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            Zola’s authorial method begins to answer this question, claiming that the author must be 
a poet-experimenter, blending scientific rigor with an artist’s intuition in order to understand “the 
reciprocal work of society of the individual and the individual on society.”166 His idea of the 
author’s role hinged on the sharp distinction he drew between an “observer,” whom he dismisses 
as uncritical, and an “experimenter” who goes beyond what is observed to record the “absolute 
determinism in the conditions of existence of natural phenomena.”167 Here, Zola quotes liberally 
from Bernard’s Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine, a medical philosophy text 
credited with establishing the modern practice of physiology:  
One gives the name ‘observer’ to one who applies the processes of simple or complex 
investigations to the study of phenomena which he does not vary and which he records, 
by consequence, as nature offers to him. One gives the name ‘experimenter’ to one who 
applies processes of simple or complex investigations to vary or modify, for some goal, 
the natural phenomena and make them appear in circumstances or conditions in which 
nature does not present them.168 
More than simply recording and presenting real-world occurrences with maximum 
verisimilitude, the author must vary or modify the conditions in which events occur, so as to 
ascertain their true nature as (presupposed) objective laws governing human behavior. 
            Here is where we see the first component of Zola’s conception of history, and how this 
conception pushes the novelist towards the historian: for Zola, the accurate representation of the 
world “as it is” is not the ultimate goal of the experimental novel, but rather a precondition for 
experimentation. Before varying or modifying events beyond the conditions in which they 
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appear in “nature,” the novelist must play the role of observer, in order represent those events as 
they actually occurred: “the observer in [the novelist] gives the facts as he as observed them, 
poses the point of departure, establishes the solid terrain on which his characters with walk and 
on which phenomena develop.”169 Real occurrences, e.g. historical events, are the field within 
which the novelist exercises their critical, artistic, and scientific faculties.  
            When acting within this historical field, the novelist is like a historian. The writer’s task, 
at the outset, is to arrive at a concrete, factual account of events as they happened, before 
intervening as an experimenter and departing from the natural circumstances under which the 
observed events occurred. The novelist takes on the role of historical researcher, gathering 
objective knowledge about the way that events happen or happened in order to recreate those 
events accurately on the page. 
The novelist’s role as a historical researcher shifts as they proceed from “taking facts in 
nature” to “studying the mechanism of the facts.”170 Here, the novelist acts as an interpreter, 
forming hypotheses about the underlying laws governing social conduct. The form which this 
revelation takes is narrative: in ascribing causality to a sequence of events, the novelist is playing 
the part of interpretive historian by arguing not just the “what” but the “why” and “how” of 
actual events. Zola’s critical point of departure from contemporary history here is that he 
presupposed this causality, expressed through literary narrative, as an objective “mechanism.” In 
doing so, Zola masked the interpretive work necessary to present a constructed narrative as a 
simple observation, which is the preliminary step of his proposed experimental method. Through 
this assumption, Zola’s initial conception of history becomes clear: it is an impartial and 
objective source of knowledge, which the novelist obtains through simple observation. The 
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novelist begins by acting within the concrete historical field and explicating events as they 
occurred, much as a historian would. 
            As the experimental novel proceeds, the second part of Zola’s historical consciousness is 
revealed: that of history as a flexible grounds for experimentation. For after studying the 
“mechanism of facts,” which Zola takes as given, the novelist must then “act on [the facts] 
through modifications of circumstance and of milieux.”171 After having observed and constructed 
the historical field, the novelist shifts their focus and begins to act upon, rather than within, 
history. Zola’s justification for this move is that although the novel cannot yet “prove that the 
social milieu is not, itself, anything but chemical and physical… it is that, certainly, or rather it is 
the variable product of a group of living beings who are themselves absolutely submitted to 
physical and chemical laws which govern living and dead bodies alike.”172 Since events proceed 
according to ascertainable physical laws, the novelist must prove those laws experimentally by 
subjecting real or (at least plausible) events to variable circumstances of the author’s making, in 
order to separate the determinate from the contingent. 
            This second phase of experimentation renders the novelist as an agent upon history, 
constructing a narrative in order to alter it rather than to interpret or explicate it. Since Zola 
requires that the novelist, even in their experimentation, must “never diverge from the laws of 
nature,” the variable circumstances that the novelist constructs independently must themselves be 
accordance with those laws, just as real, observable events are. To make such a feat possible, it’s 
implicitly necessary that the novelist is able to play with history as representative of “real” life. 
In other words, the novelist is as capable of representing “real” social laws using circumstances 
of their own construction as they are capable of representing those laws in the form of concrete 
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past events. The historical field, then, is not just an immutable source of knowledge, but is also 
necessarily subject to an amount of flexibility and contingency: events happened as they 
happened, but the novelist must figure out the “why” by altering the historical “who,” “what,” 
“when,” and “how.” By assuming that observed events, so altered, contain the same amount of 
explanatory power, Zola implicitly states that constructed history is of equal validity to actual 
history, provided that the constructed history adheres to “natural laws.” (Zola never provides a 
working definition of what those laws are, or how they might be concretely defined.) Thus, the 
novelist supersedes the abilities of the historian, and is able to actually alter history to express a 
more fundamental, “natural” truth than history qua history ever could.  
The Experimental Novel in Practice: Reality as Mechanistic in Germinal 
 Zola does not explain in The Experimental Novel how a writer might formally 
accomplish their positivistic task. He elides the question entirely, stating that “Not only does 
genius, for the writer, find itself in feeling, in the idea a priori, but it is also in the form, in the 
style. The question of method and the question of rhetoric are distinct.”173 What he doesn’t 
answer in theory, however, is answered in practice. Zola’s novel Germinal shows how the 
author’s mechanistic view of history is reflected in his literary choices. 
 This is not to say that Zola’s corpus is a series of truly “experimental” works as the 
author might define them. Indeed, Henri Mitterand, a preeminent French scholar of Zola, has 
argued that “The naturalist novel… and naturalist discourse aren’t counterparts. Naturalist 
discourse theorizes a novel which has not been written, or which has been written differently. 
Germinal isn’t the application of the experimental novel.”174 Nevertheless, Mitterand cautions at 
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the same time against “committing the inverse error which denies any relation between the 
theory of the experimental novel and the Rougon-Macquart.”175 Consequently, my analysis is 
predicated on the acknowledgement that although Zola is not necessarily conducting 
“experiments” in Germinal, the literary choices made throughout the novel are nonetheless 
symptomatic of the same positivistic historical consciousness, and the same conception of the 
use of fiction to disclose “truth,” that informs the experimental novel. Zola’s literary choices in 
Germinal are less important for their scientific validity or adherence to a recognizable scientific 
method than they are as displays of Zola’s conception of the deterministic relationship between 
the historical part and whole, and his belief that a fictional truth, responsibly constructed, is equal 
in stature to that of an observed truth. 
 The first and most important choice that Zola makes is the narrative form of Germinal. 
What kind of story best expresses the “natural” truths that Zola is searching for as a novelist? 
What metanarrative structure best contains and discloses knowledge as Zola conceives of it? In 
Germinal, Zola chooses the plot structure of a tragedy. This choice is fitting: as Hayden White 
argues, one possible macro view of history is the conception of human events as unalterable, if 
not predestined, and therefore as tragedy.176 Such a view is predicated on the conception of 
historical events and people as related to one another through metonymy, a literary trope in 
which a name or attribute of a certain thing is used to refer to that thing in its entirely (for 
example, “the Oval Office” for the U.S. Presidency). The metonymical view of historical events 
implies a mechanistic view of historical continuity: events exist in a part-whole relationship, with 
each event, however distinct, representing some aspect of a larger historical force. The nature of 
this “force” can be variously identified—Marx, for example, ascribed historical events to 
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relations of production in order to arrive at his mechanistic theory of dialectical materialism. 
What is important to note here is that in such a conception of history, events are identified less in 
their particularity or contingency than in their status as demonstrative elements of a larger 
process. Here, that larger process is the socially determinate laws which Zola presupposes. 
 The narrative corollary to a mechanistic view of history is tragedy. Tragedy functions as 
a collective catharsis: the revelation, and often the critique, of societal laws and taboos, through 
the tragic hero’s failure. In history, then, tragic narratives serve to reveal to the historical 
observer the nature of things as they are.  
In Germinal, tragic emplotment serves as a device to reveal to the reader the nature of 
things as they are, at least in Zola’s view. The novel follows a group of lifelong coal miners in 
northern France who, tired of their dangerous working conditions and low pay, strike. This strike 
is met by the mine’s owners with overwhelming force, and after a violent confrontation and the 
deaths of several protagonists, the strike fails. The novel’s main character, Etiénne Lantier, is 
defeated in his quest to secure a better standard of living for himself and his comrades. This 
tragic ending reveals the nature of power and labor relations, and the inevitability of conflict 
between capitalists and the proletariat. 
Here, analyses of Zola’s relation to Marxist thinking become fruitful avenues for 
understanding the author’s metonymic historical consciousness. N.R. Cirillo has argued that Zola 
“transforms historic dialectic into historic myth”177 in order to give formal structure to the novel. 
The events of Germinal, in other words, are to be understood as parts of a larger process of 
inevitable, predetermined conflict. Representing these events within a tragic narrative arc is one 
way to underscore their inevitability even further. By rendering Marxism, a materialist rather 
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than metaphysical lens, as “myth”—as a prefiguring narrative—Zola gives Germinal its power to 
disclose objective and determinate truths in the guise of fiction. Tragedy underscores the societal 
tensions that create interpersonal conflict; a Marxist tragedy, then, reveals those tensions to be 
the result of historically determined class conflict, and Zola’s use of a tragic plot informed by 
Marxism shows his “adherence to the principal of the historic necessity of the revolution.”178 
Thus, at the novel’s end, Cirillo remarks, “Étienne’s personal resurrection is measurable only by 
the collective resurrection of that exploited nation of workers.”179 
American literary critic Irving Howe has made similar observations of Zola’s use of 
ordering myth and metanarrative, writing that Zola presents a “schematized vision of historical 
reality, or at least a perspective on historical reality.”180 He explicitly connects Zola’s Marxist 
schema to plot, writing that “Marxism speak[s] of a historical choice: freedom or barbarism. It is 
a choice allowing for and perhaps forming the substance of tragedy.”181 Determinate laws, 
ordered in Germinal as something closely approaching a Marxian analysis, do not exist in any 
tension with an author’s ability to use their own creative skills to analyze and disclose objective 
truth. Rather, as Howe observes, they inform how an author applies those skills in giving form to 
a narrative. Consequently, Zola’s authorial genius “comes through in the mythic-historical sweep 
of the narrative as a whole.”182 
In connecting Zola to Marxism, I do not intend to argue that Zola was himself a 
Marxist—indeed, that is far from the case.183 Rather, I want to emphasize that Zola’s choice of 
certain metanarrative forms can be taken as symptomatic of Zola’s mechanistic historical 
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consciousness. And, further, Zola’s use of mythical and metanarrative constructions to 
communicate historically “real” truths of the type revealed by Marxian theory is only defensible 
from the viewpoint that such ordering principles are objectively valid analytical lenses. To 
consider Zola’s theory of history is arguably to consider that the historian, in creating history 
within a metanarrative structure and only then analyzing what “truth” that narrative may hold, is 
closer to the naturalist novelist than they may care to admit.  
Lukács, offering a Marxist appreciation of Balzac’s realism, wrote that its power was due 
to “the fact that it is solidly based on a correctly interpreted social existence.” It might seem that 
Zola’s naturalism is attempting a similarly “correct” interpretation of social existence, however 
Zola’s own physiology-inspired method replaced interpretation with scientific experimentation. 
Whereas Balzac, per Lukács, presented organic social relationships as “objective conflicts” in 
order to represent and interpret them, it could be said that Zola did the opposite: distilling 
universal objective laws into social conflicts. Balzac’s constative view of reality positioned 
history and its telling as the driving force behind future historical events; in Zola’s objective 
view, on the other hand, history is merely the rational output of social inputs. The goal is not to 
arrive at a subjectively correct “interpretation” of social existence, but rather to divine, through 
“objective” organizing principles, the casual operations of social existence. 
Mechanism Expressed Through Representational Technique 
In addition to his tragic story structure, Zola’s line-level literary choices further construct 
reality as “schematized,” as the field in which careful observation will disclose certain laws, 
which can then be formally communicated to the reader. Attending to these micro details is 
crucial to understanding Zola’s historical consciousness, since any narrative construction of 
historical reality ultimately takes place at a basic verbal level. 
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Zola’s mechanistic view of history as governed by identifiable, immutable forces is 
reflected in his careful selection of certain words to create a metonymic relationship between the 
mine and its workers. For example, Zola uses the French “bête” frequently in the novel’s 
opening section. This French word can mean “beast,” and Zola uses the term to refer to horses 
and other beasts of burden in the mine.184 However, the word can also be used as a pejorative 
adjective to mean “stupid,” “idiotic,” or “foolish,” and this meaning is frequently used by the 
miners. When Étienne does not express interest in his crush, Catherine, after the two find 
themselves alone in the mine, he is described as feeling “bête”.185 These individual conceptions 
of bête are joined together in Zola’s description of the Maheus, a coal mining family, as the 
“bétail humain,” or “human livestock.”186 
This common term, used to refer to both people and animals, renders the two alike, both 
sub-human in relation to the mine, which is described at one point as “having, day and night, 
human insects digging into the rock.”187 Zola uses “bête” to assign the miners a pejorative part-
whole relationship to the mine, which is itself a stand-in for capitalist modes of production. In 
using diction as a technique to communicate this “reality,” Zola simultaneously determines and 
communicates to the reader that this is the historically “realistic” situation: the mine rendering 
the people within it as subhuman cogs in a massive machine may as well be literal, in addition to 
literary. While the “human insects” are not actually sprouting extra limbs and antennae, their 
social reality is revealed to be essentially analogous to drones in a hive. 
Zola’s choice of term for the novel’s primary setting, the Voreux mine, is similarly 
indicative of his use of diction to disclose broader truths. The mine is introduced in the book’s 
 
184 Émile Zola, Germinal (Jefferson Publication, 2015), 20. All translations my own. 
185 Ibid, 8. 
186 Ibid, 7.  
187 Ibid, 22. 
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first paragraphs with the sentence “Then, the man recognized a pit.”188 The French word Zola 
uses here is “fosse,” a term which is commonly translated as “pit” or “grave”189 rather than 
“mine”—indeed, the French term “mine” is more-or-less a direct analogue to its English cognate. 
Cirillo makes the point forcefully: “What the man recognizes… is the truth: it is a ‘fosse,’ not 
just a phenomenon identified by the neutral and technical word ‘mine’.”190  
Zola’s use of such a term is without a doubt deliberate, and its function is clear: the mine 
is misery, if not hell itself. It is a sight of capitalist abuse and exploitation, not just a hole in the 
ground but a site imbued with the mythical importance of a final resting place. And it is because 
of this that the miners will inevitably (literally) rise up to fight against the bourgeoisie who own 
and operate the mine. In ascribing macro moral and political significance to Voreux, Zola is once 
again analyzing and disclosing broad social laws through their manifestation in the particular, 
using the mine as shorthand for the types of abuse that workers suffer under the capitalist mode 
of production. Zola applies metonymical techniques not just to people and their various relations, 
but to the inanimate objects that determine social relations, in particular relations of production. 
This apparently moral judgement, rendering the mine as a hellish pit, can be taken as “truth” 
through the application of the novelist’s unique ability, per Zola, to use their individual faculties 
to construct pictures of reality that are as “true” as the historical past itself. 
Conclusion: Truer than Truth? 
 Henri Mitterand states that Zola’s corpus, and particularly the Rougon Macquart cycle, 
constitutes a series of “historical tableaus, somewhat in the fashion of engravings and 
 
188 Ibid, 4. 
189 Collins French-English Dictionary, s.v. “fosse” https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/french-
english/fosse. 
190 Cirillo, 246, italics mine. 
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photographs.”191 These “tableaus,” I have argued, constitute the first part of Zola’s historical 
consciousness: history exists as a set of recognizable and analyzable events that reveal, through 
close examination, broader determinate social laws. Mitterand continues: “More deeply, they 
come to punctuate and illustrate a global interpretation of contemporary political history.”192 
This “global interpretation” constitutes the second part of Zola’s historical consciousness. By 
using rigorously researched but ultimately fictional events to illustrate the nature of universal 
social laws, the novelist constructs a compelling case for the universality of those social laws: no 
fiction that makes any claim to realism can escape them. Indeed, fiction might be thought of as 
the final proving ground for such laws: if a novelist’s invented characters come to life as 
compelling and realistic characters, could it not be that their very relatability comes from their 
existence within the social laws that the novelist has discovered through observation and 
experimentation and is now performing for the reader through narrative?  
 Through such a lens, both narrative structure and line-level choices become crucial tools 
by which novelists might communicate these “scientific” truths to their readers: metanarrative 
structure provides the method by which the book’s events (its parts) are shown to culminate in a 
social truth (its whole). Micro literary choices do the inverse: they provide the novelist with a 
way to show how a story’s broader truth can manifest in its parts.  
 Zola, in his quest to understand how literature might be raised to the same “truth” as 
science, arrives at a conception of history that places a premium on construction rather than 
explication. The novelist’s work is useful precisely because of the novelist’s unique skill in both 
observing and “experimenting.” Through his faith in literary acts of construction, Zola allows the 
novelist to surpass and even negate the role of the historian and of history qua history itself. 
 
191 Mitterand, Zola et le Naturalisme, 46.  
192 Ibid, 46. 
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History is important to knowledge insofar as it fuels the analytic and creative fires of the literary 
























Germinal presents a paradox: the book was ostensibly written as an objective, 
experimental study into human social laws. And yet the novel’s afterlife was political and 
cultural, not scientific: at Zola’s funeral procession seventeen years after Germinal’s publication, 
“Fifty thousand people followed… among them a delegation of miners from the Denain coalfield 
[in northern France] rhythmically chanted, ‘Germinal! Germinal!’ through the streets of 
Paris. Even today, the novel has a special place in the folklore of the mining communities of 
France.”193 The novel that Zola understood to be unbiased, part of a project intended to expose a 
broad social “determinism,” took on a subjective life, not an objective one. And even the most 
generous reading of Germinal as documentary does not deny that the work is a triumph of 
literature, not of science or historical scholarship. The most putatively detached, source-oriented, 
and “scientific” of the realist novelists is also the one whose work is considered most nakedly 
political. 
Germinal might be taken, then, as an example of the limits of positivist narrative 
thinking, even as positivism reached a dominant methodological position in disciplines ranging 
from the sciences to sociology and, of course, history. Although Zola presents Germinal as a 
mechanistic, deterministic narrative, there is no getting around the fact that narrative forms 
cannot be objective—or, as White once remarked in an interview, “There is no narrative that 
ever displays the consistency of a logical deduction.”194 Zola never attempted to deny that his 
work possessed political salience, but it is still notable that his realist, “naturalist” work, which 
 
193 Robert Lethbridge, Introduction to Germinal, by Émile Zola, trans. Peter Collier (Oxford World’s Classics, 
1993), vii. 
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attempted to depict real life as transparently as possible, is nevertheless a political, social, and 
cultural polemic. Zola might speak the language of positivism literally in his Experimental 
Novel, and figuratively in Germinal, but its reception reveals a formal limit: a narrative form, 
like the novel or the traditional history, cannot help being an ideological statement, if not in its 
author’s mind, then in its social life post-publication. As Balzac wrote, “the fact is no longer 
anything in itself, it is wholly the idea others form of it.” 
This thesis has argued that across the 19th century, the rise of positivism in the sciences 
and the social, political, and cultural crises that informed that rise have been reflected in the shift 
in historical thinking of French historians, represented by Michelet, and novelists, represented by 
Balzac and Zola. Both Michelet and Balzac, writing before history’s positivist turn, display a 
great deal of historical subjectivity. Michelet narrated poetic histories from a clear ideological 
position and with an ideal historical telos in mind, and Balzac wrote from an understanding that 
the act of telling a story, and the social realities that that storytelling creates, is the fundamental 
concern of history. These subjective positions were unproblematic for Michelet and Balzac, 
because they understood a subtle but crucial distinction between a historical “fact” and a 
historical “truth.”   
Zola did not live or work in the same context as Michelet or Balzac. His mature works 
were published in an increasingly rationalist republican age, rather than one of monarchy and 
reaction. Zola’s positivist thinking reflects a broader turn to rationalist epistemological principles 
rather than subjective or ideological ones, which had failed to create political or social stability. 
Between 1800 and 1870, six different governments assumed control of the French state. 
Subjective history, like that of Michelet and Balzac, had failed to fully anticipate or comprehend 
the social disharmony created by the rapid shift from Napoleon’s empire to two different 
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monarchies, then to a short-lived republic, then a second empire, and finally to the Third 
Republic. Absent a compelling or useable concept of national social coherence or an ideological 
position that could account for the forces behind these rapid, extreme historical shifts, liberalism 
adopted an ostensibly value-neutral positivism. 
 Balzac, writing about the period directly following the First Empire, had “[devoted] 
novels, essays, and sketches to the semiotics of the city [of Paris] and its inhabitants,” depicting 
characters who sought to answer the social question, “How do you pin down the meaning of a 
world in constant transformation?”195 Zola, following Claude Bernard’s physiological science, 
attempted to “pin down” this meaning outside of social codes: “I will try to find and follow, by 
solving the double question of temperaments and milieus, the thread that leads mathematically 
from one man to another,”196 he announced in the preface to the first Rougon-Macquart novel. 
Between Michelet and Balzac and Zola loom four governments, several major military 
campaigns,197 and the world-historic revolutions of 1848 and their aftermath. Confronting these 
developments, which took place within four decades, Zola, along with the new “objective” 
academic historians, sought out the empirical, objective “constants” that could explain the nature 
of constant transformation.  
Both novelists and historians were attempting to modulate their work into this new 
discourse of objectivity, perhaps in order to defend the value of their work as the Third Republic 
increasingly emphasized objective knowledge as the cornerstone of its liberal political program. 
In 1871, the first year of the Third Republic, Gustave Flaubert wrote to fellow novelist George 
Sand that “It will be the first time that we have lived under a government without principles. The 
 
195 Brooks, 19. 
196 Zola, Preface to The Fortune of the Rougons, 5, italics mine. 
197 Including the French conquest of Algeria in 1830, the 1854–1856 Crimean War, and the 1870 Franco-Prussian 
war, which lead to the collapse of the Second Empire. 
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era of positivism in politics is about to begin.”198 The Third Republic’s project was to emphasize 
industrial development and create a “new type of society”199 which could withstand the class 
divisions that had rent the social fabric of previous French governments. Such a society was 
necessarily predicated on an identification of science with progress. Gavin Murray-Miller writes 
that “No longer could action be guided by strict ideology or idealism; experimentation, analysis, 
and flexibility… were perceived to be the new principles needed in bringing forth the republic 
and promoting social order and progress.”200 With this in mind, it is not difficult to understand 
how Zola arrived at the conviction that his realist novel must somehow be scientific, even if he 
could never fully articulate how it could be so. For society to progress, knowledge needed to 
proceed along, to recall Zola’s words, an “an identical scientific path.” His experimental novel 
was guided by the precepts of experimentation and analysis, through the novelist’s depiction of 
realistic social scenarios, as well as by the aesthetic flexibility that constituted their unique 
contribution to the objective study of human societies.  
Throughout this thesis, I have been discussing literature in the traditional tone of 
contemporary historical writing—analytic, if not dry, and somewhat detached, if not disengaged. 
My discussion of historical consciousness in the realist novel has been from the perspective of a 
historian, and not that of a literary writer. But this is not how novels are met by the popular 
imagination. Balzac and Zola are not remembered for their historical minds, nor are they even 
remembered for their technical facility with language; they are remembered because people read 
their books and felt something. This subjective reception, I have learned, is not so different from 
 
198 Flaubert to Sand, 1871, as quoted in Gavin Murray-Miller, “Defining Modernity: mentality and ideology under 
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alternative understandings of history like Michelet’s that have since been eschewed. My research 
into the deeply historical character of both history and literature has shown me that the line 
between the two is contingent and flexible, if not entirely imposed. Asked once what he 
considered his profession to be, Hayden White, University of Michigan-trained medievalist, 
responded that “I am a writer.”201 It’s taken me a deep dive into White, along with a bunch of 
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